As Alain Alcouffe and I mentioned in our previous two posts (see here and here), a dramatic political showdown was unfolding in real time in Rousseau’s Republic of Geneva during Adam Smith’s sojourn in Switzerland, a constitutional stalemate that Smith and his circle could not have failed to notice. In November 1765, for example, the General Council of Geneva had refused to rubber-stamp a slate of pre-approved candidates for the offices of Procureur-Général and Auditeur, and in response to this deliberate inaction, the Small Council chose to fan the flames of this political conflagration by extending the terms of these outgoing officers indefinitely.

But how would Geneva’s General Council respond? Would it retaliate against the Small Council’s unprecedented and unconstitutional provocation by refusing to elect any leaders (known as “Syndics”) in the next scheduled round of elections? That is precisely what was about to occur! Overnight, Geneva would transform herself from a proud and well-oiled self-governing city-state into an 18th-century Swiss-equivalent of a “banana republic”, a nominally prosperous but small, unruly, and politically unstable country dependent on foreign powers for her own survival.

Specifically, when the General Council met on 5 January 1766 for the annual election of Geneva’s four Syndics, it refused to confirm any of the Syndics up for election. In all, the General Council met four times — on the 5th, 12th, 19th, and 26th of January — and large majorities on each occasion invoked the “la ligne de nouvelle élection” procedure in order to keep anyone from getting elected to the office of Syndic. (Bennett 1995, p. 145.)

Moreover, according to one source (ibid., p. 146 n.49, citing “BPU Genève, Cramer 87, Vol. 2 [1766] 28 février-31 décembre 105”), Geneva was exceedingly tense on 26 January in the hours leading up to the fourth and final meeting of the General Council. This constitutional impasse almost led to an outbreak of violence at the steps of the St. Pierre, the cathedral where the General Council was about to convene for a fourth and final time that month:

Ce même nuit il y eut de très grands mouvement dans [les] rues de la Ville [de Genève]. Un part de jeunes gens avoit (dit-on) formé le projet de s’emparer des portes de St. Pierre pour empêcher leur venue au C.G. [Conseil Général]. Les Chefs des Répresentants réussirent a les en détourner. [quoted in ibid., pp. 145-146]

For all practical purposes, then, by refusing to elect a new slate of Syndics, the General Council had effectively abolished Geneva’s main governing body, and the self-governing Republic of Geneva would thus become ungovernable. Furthermore, the epic constitutional impasse resulting from this political deadlock between the General and Small councils would not be resolved until two years later, 1768. But before we proceed any further, however, it is now worth taking a moment to ask, Why are we so certain that Adam Smith must have taken notice of this unfolding constitutional crisis during his sojourn in Switzerland?

Simply put, how could he not have? One of his closest contacts in Geneva was Dr Theodore Tronchin, the brother of the Procureur-Général, Jean-Robert Tronchin, while another of his Geneva contacts also happened to be a syndic or chief magistrate, identified as the “Syndic Turretin” in John Rae’s biography of Adam Smith. But these observations beg the all-important question, How do we know that Adam Smith was still in Geneva in January of 1766? Alain Alcouffe and I will address this critical question when we resume our series on Adam Smith in Switzerland in the next day or two …