Nota bene: Here are the previous ten installments — parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 — in my multi-part series on Adam Smith’s day-to-day duties as a commissioner of the Board of Customs of Scotland. Endnotes are below the fold.
Order #127 is dated __ Nov. 1784 (the day is cut off) and is signed by the same three commissioners (and in the same sequence) who signed the previous two orders (#126 and #125): David Reid (top signature), Adam Smith (middle), and James Edgar (bottom). This third Reid-Smith-Edgar order illustrates a certain level of inter-agency cooperation between excise and customs officials and reads as follows:
“Having received your Letter of the 21st of last Month, enclosing Return of Seizure No. 290 by Mr. Alexander Fullarton Supervisor of Excise for Eleven dozen of Bottled Wine—and also Return No. 291 by Messrs. Robert Anderson Land Surveyor and Archibald Chisholm Landwaiter, for two pipes of Portugal red Wine; — We have ordered the said two Returns to be registered, — a Third only of the latter to be allowed, — and we direct you to inform us whether any Cattle or Carriages were employed in the removal of the wine contained in Return No. 290.” [1]
This order thus refers to two separate “returns” or reports of “seizure”: one effectuated by an excise officer; the other completed by two customs officers. [2] In addition, by issuing the directive “We have ordered the said two Returns to be registered”, the board officially authorizes the legal process for the formal condemnation and forfeiture of these two government seizures of contraband wine to commence in the Court of Exchequer. These seizures also illustrate two important aspects of 18th-century anti-smuggling statutes.
One is the broad scope of these laws: any cattle, carts, or carriages used to transport contraband were subject to forfeiture, along with the illicit goods themselves. [3] That is why, with respect to one of the seizures, consisting of some 132 bottles (11 dozen) of contraband wine (“Return of Seizure No. 290”), the board orders a follow-up audit (“whether any Cattle or Carriages were employed in the removal of the wine”) to determine whether any additional valuable property can be seized for the Crown’s account.
The other is the direct financial incentives of customs officers to confiscate contraband, for under 18th-century smuggling laws, [5] the proceeds from forfeited goods were divided between the Crown (or the Exchequer) and the seizing officers and informers, and according to one historian of the Customs service (Hoon 1968), these rewards were a lucrative source of income for many revenue officers:
“The emolument which comprised the officers shares of the produce of seizures gave the strongest impetus to activity against violation of customs laws. By 12 Charles II, c. 4, half the produce of a seizure was to go to the Crown and half to the seizing officer; but the amount varied between one third and nine tenths according to the act of Parliament governing the particular kinds of goods seized, or according to the discretion of the Lords of the Treasury or the Customs Commissioners. If an officer was lucky, a seizure might yield him a neat fortune which would amount to more than he could earn in several years of ordinary labor. The jealousy in search and Seizure testifies vividly to the stimulative value of such rewards.” (Hoon 1968, p. 219, footnote omitted)
That is why, regarding the other seizure, involving two pipes (large casks) of Port wine (“Return No. 291”), [4] the commissioners cap the officers’ financial reward from the proceeds of the seizure: “a Third only of the latter to be allowed.” The one-third cap on the customs officers’ reward in this case doesn’t tell us the whole story, however, for as we shall see in my next two posts, these financial rewards might also tempt some revenue officers to cheat.






