Nota bene: For reference, here are my previous installments — parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 — in my multi-part series on Adam Smith’s day-to-day duties as a commissioner of the Board of Customs of Scotland.
In one of my previous posts (see here), I repeated the oft-quoted words of Sir Walter Scott about smugglers — “Smuggling was almost universal in Scotland, for people unaccustomed to imposts and regarding them as an unjust aggression upon their ancient liberties, made no scruple to elude them …” — and I then asked, “What scruples, if any, did Smith have in prosecuting them?” As it happens, if Order #123 is any indication, Smith and his fellow commissioners on the Board of Customs may have had quite a few such scruples. Let me explain:
To begin, Order #123 is dated 9 November 1784 and is signed by James Edgar (top signature), Adam Smith (middle), and Basil Cochrane (bottom). In addition, this order refers to the same local customs official as the previous two orders in my sample (#121 & #120): Mr. George Henderson, the tide-surveyor who was stationed at Cromarty in North East Scotland.
In summary, Henderson had suspected four local boats of illicitly offloading contraband from another vessel along the coast of Caithness, an even more remote area of Scotland located north of Cromarty (see map pictured below). Henderson wrote up a report describing his observations, and his report was forwarded to the Board of Customs on 2 November (“the 2nd Instant“). The board then issued its ruling seven days later:
“We have considered your Letter of the 2nd Instant, with a Letter from Mr. George Henderson Tide Surveyor relative to four Boats concerned in smuggling goods out of a Vessel on the Coast of Caithness; And we do not think proper at this time, and under the Circumstances of the Case, to seize the Boats, but Mr. Henderson is to continue his endeavours to come at the full knowledge of this transaction for our information.”
In other words, despite the report of illicit activity, the board orders the local customs officers to stand down: “we do not think proper at this time, and under the Circumstances of the Case, to seize the Boats“! So, instead of seizing or impounding the boats, the board instructs Henderson to continue gathering more evidence and to report back (“to come at the full knowledge of this transaction for our information”).
This non-order thus poses a minor puzzle: why was the board so reluctant to order the seizure of the four boats suspected of smuggling? It is true that government agents in 18th-century Britain were personally liable for their actions under ordinary private law. (Unlike today, British public officials who committed private wrongs or “torts” could not assert “sovereign immunity.” See generally Jennifer L. Mascott & R. Trent McCotter, “Federal Officer Suits by Common Law,” Cato Supreme Court Review, (2021-2022), pp. 111-140.) An order wrongfully impounding someone’s property could thus expose Henderson, who would be the one to carry out the board’s order, to a lawsuit for damages.
But at the same time, Parliament had enacted a special statute specifically for customs officials like Henderson, shielding them from liability when they acted with probable cause. Among other things, this law, known as the “Offences against Customs or Excise Act” (19 Geo. 2. c. 34), authorized judges in seizure trials to formally certify whether there was probable cause for the seizure. If the judge found probable cause, the statute limited the plaintiff’s recovery to the return of the seized goods (or their bare value) or a symbolic one pence (1d.) of damages, while also barring any costs of suit against the officer. (See Francis Buller, An Introduction to the Law relative to Trials at Nisi Prius, London: Strahan & Woodfall (1790), available here or here, at p. 45.) Although we have no way of knowing for sure, perhaps it was Adam Smith who counselled caution in this case.





