Thus far this past week (see here, here, here, here, and here), we have done a deep dive into paragraphs 1 to 53 of Part #12 of the pamphlet “Additions and Corrections to the First and Second Editions of Dr. Adam Smith’s Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” (Smith 1784, pp. 23-46). But I have saved the best for last: the closing paragraph of Part #12 (paragraph 54). It is here, in this concluding paragraph to Part #12 of his 1784 pamphlet, that Adam Smith pulls back the green curtain, so to speak — like Dorothy’s dog Toto in The Wizard of Oz — to reveal the true villains of his story:
“It cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of this whole mercantile system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose interest has been entirely neglected; but the producers, whose interest has been so carefully attended to; and among this latter class our merchants and manufacturers have been by far the principal architects. In the mercantile regulations, which have been taken notice of in this chapter, the interest of our manufacturers has been most peculiarly attended to; and the interest, not so much of the consumers, as that of some other sets of producers, has been sacrificed to it.” (Smith 1784, p. 47)
On this note, compare the “Big Tech” firms of today, such as Apple, Google, Meta/Facebook, Microsoft, and OpenAI, to the evil economic “contrivers” of Smith’s day. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose!
But how is such a small group of nefarious “contrivers” — past and present — able to manipulate the legal system to put their private economic and legal interests ahead of those of the great majority of the public: consumers? Whatever happened to the consequentialist notion of “the greatest good for the greatest number”?
As it happens, Adam Smith anticipates Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action by two centuries. Buried deep in his discussion of the wool market in England (see paragraph 34 on pp. 38-39 of Smith’s 1784 pamphlet), the Scottish scholar compares and contrasts cattle ranchers and sheep farmers (“graziers”) on the one hand with the manufacturers of leather and woollen goods on the other:
“Graziers separated from one another, and dispersed through all the different corners of
the country, cannot, without great difficulty, combine together for the purpose either of imposing monopolies upon their fellow citizens, or of exempting themselves from such as may have been imposed upon them by other people. Manufacturers of all kinds, collected together in numerous bodies in all great cities, easily can.” (Smith 1784, p. 38)
In other words, there is a market for political and legal favors just like there is a market for ordinary goods like wool, leather, and meat. Large and diffuse majorities — whether they be cattle ranchers, sheep farmers, or consumers — are unable to effectively band together to lobby the government to protect their interests because they are spatially dispersed across the country. (Implicit in the passage above is what Mancur Olson makes explicit: when a group is large and dispersed, the benefits to any individual member of the group of lobbying the government are small relative to the costs of banding together.) Small and geographically-concentrated groups, by contrast, are another story. They can more easily organize and band together than large and diffuse majorities can because the financial rewards for them are large. Simply put, the costs of banding together for small and concentrated groups are worth it.
Nota bene: I will be taking next week off, but starting on Monday, 27 July, I will turn my attention to the last separate substantive section of Smith’s 1784 pamphlet: Part #13.