Science Sunday

Before I resume my review of Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, I want to share an observation about the meaning of “science” with my loyal followers. To the point, science is not just about answers or absolute certainty; it’s also about the formulation of hypotheses or “Popperian conjectures” — or in plain English, science is about coming up with good guesses that then can be tested or proven wrong. By way of example, via @alexandrosM, here are 14 hypotheses or possible answers to the following question, Why don’t we have a more potent Delta-targeting vaccine right now? (Hat tip: the Amazing Tyler Cowen.)

Do climate scientists understand the scientific method? | Utopia, you are  standing in it!
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Pencil Art

Pictured below are multiple miniature works of “pencil art” by Dalton Ghetti, who is originally from Brazil. Mr Ghetti refuses to work with a magnifying glass and only uses three tools: a razor blade, a sewing needle, and a sculpting knife. More details about Ghetti and his miniature works of art are available here and here (hat tip: @pickover).

alphabet carved into pencils The Most Incredible Miniature Pencil Art [20 pics]

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Is politics a branch of moral philosophy?

I will resume my in-depth review of Robert Nozick’s magnum opus on Monday morning; in the meantime, I want to share two remarkable sentences from page 6 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia and one of my favorite Nozick quotations of all time:

Moral philosophy sets the background for, and boundaries of political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they may do through the apparatus of the state.

Is Nozick right about this? Is politics a branch of moral philosophy? What about law?

American Institute for Economic Research on Twitter: ""How much room do  individual rights leave for the state?" Happy birthday to Robert Nozick!  Harvard University professor, American libertarian philosopher, and author  of 'Anarchy,
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Nozick’s open questions

I am reblogging part 14 of my in-depth review of Robert Nozick’s “Anarchy, State, and Utopia.” The post below concludes my review of Chapter 3 of Nozick’s magnum opus with the following series of questions:

  1. Locke versus Hobbes. Why assume a Lockean state of nature in the first place?
  2. Enforcement of promises in the state of nature. How are promises between the members of a mutual protection group enforced? Indeed, how can there be private protection markets at all in the absence of pro-market institutions such as property law and contract law?
  3. Scope of the non-aggression principle. What are the contents of Nozick’s side constraints? If the contents of such side constraints consist of simple rules such as “do not harm others” or “do not commit any acts of aggression against others,” how do we define the concepts of “harm” or “aggression”?
  4. Scope of the self-defense exception. What exceptions should we (must we?) carve out from these side constraints? In particular, if the only justified exception is self-defense, what is the scope of this exception?
  5. Individuals versus families. Why do “individuals” matter more to Nozick than families, clans, villages, or other such organic collective entities?
  6. Last question. What is the ultimate source of Nozick’s moral side constraints?

prior probability

Nozick ends Chapter 3 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia by drawing up a tantalizing road map of the rest of his philosophical project (p. 53, emphasis in original):

“The remainder of Part I … attempts to justify the minimal state. In Part II, we argue that no state more powerful or extensive than the minimal state is legitimate or justifiable …”

As a result, Part I of the book (Chapters 1 to 6) corresponds to a world of stateless anarchy–a world of private protection rackets with each one dominant on its own turf–and the remainder of Part I (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) will explain how, in Nozick’s own words (p. 52), “the transition from [private protection rackets] to a minimal state must morally occur.” Next, Part II of ASU (Chapters 7, 8, and 9), which corresponds to the world of the classical liberal nightwatchman state, will argue that such…

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What are Nozick’s moral side constraints based on?

Happy Thanksgiving to my readers in the USA. Here, I am reblogging part 13 of my in-depth review of Robert Nozick’s magnum opus “Anarchy, State, and Utopia.” The post below covers the next-to-last section in Chapter 3 of Nozick’s classic work, and it launches a devastating critique of Nozick’s claims regarding the source of moral constraints. Can Nozick recover from this embarrassing intellectual fumble? I will conclude my review of Chapter 3 and then proceed into Chapter 4 in my next two posts.

prior probability

In our previous post, we reviewed subsections five, six, and seven of Chapter 3 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia (ASU). Here, we will review the next-to-last subsection of this long chapter. In short, after building a strong case in favor of universal moral side constraints in those middle subsections, Nozick then poses afoundational or higher-order question in the eighth subsection (pp. 48-51): What are these side constraints themselves based on? To summarize Nozick’s answer, he first identifies several traits shared by (all or most?) individuals–traits such as rationality, free will, and moral agency–and then argues that, combined, these traits “add up to something whose significance is clear: a being able to formulate long-term plans for its life” (p. 49). Nozick thus conjectures that a person’s “ability to form a picture of one’s whole life (or at least significant chunks of it) and to act in terms of some overall…

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Nozick’s strong case for moral side constraints

I am reblogging part 12 of my extended review of Robert Nozick’s “Anarchy, State, and Utopia.” The post below covers sections five, six, and seven of Chapter 3 of Nozick’s magnum opus, and it is here where Nozick starts to shine. Below is an excerpt from part 12 of my review:

“But Nozick’s best argument … in favor of the universality of moral constraints appears in the seventh subsection of Ch. 3 (pp. 45-47), where Nozick imagines the possibility of an alien race of superbeings who ‘stand to us as it is usually thought we do to animals’ (p. 45, emphasis in original). According to Nozick, even if humans were somehow morally superior to animals, moral side constraints should apply to human-animal interactions as they do to human-human interactions, for if there were such an alien race of superbeings …, and if they were to ever come into contact with us, wouldn’t we want them to follow the side-constraint view of morality in their dealings with us?”

prior probability

Since the Thanksgiving break, we have been rereading and reviewing Robert Nozick’s classic work of political philosophy Anarchy, State, and Utopia (ASU), one of our favorite academic books of all time. Thus far, we have posted our reviews of the Preface, Chapter 1, Chapter 2, and the first four subsections of Chapter 3. Here, we will review the next three subsections of Chapter 3–subsections five, six, and seven on pp. 35-47 of ASU. Although we have previously pointed out many flaws and problems with Nozick’s reasoning, Nozick totally redeems himself here. In summary, these three subsections not only contain many memorable examples andintriguing thought experiments, such as a “utility monster” (p. 41), an “experience machine” (p. 42), and a “transformation machine” (p. 44); together, these subsections contain a highly-original and thought-provoking extended discussion on our moral duties towards non-human animals and on the moral duties that an alien race of…

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Nozick’s non-aggression principle

I am reblogging part 11 of my in-depth review of Nozick’s “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” (ASU). The post below covers the fourth section of Chapter 3 of ASU, where Nozick justifies his non-aggression principle. As I explain below, however, Nozick’s reasoning appears to be circular. According to Nozick, individuals have rights — rights that must always be respected under the side constraint view — because they have “separate lives”, i.e. because they are individuals! Also, what about children? Non-human animals? All Nozick has done (thus far) is to assume the primacy of the individual over the family or the animal kingdom or other collective. More fundamentally, Nozick doesn’t define (at least not yet) what constitutes “aggression” or otherwise demarcate the outer limits of the non-aggression principle beyond physical harm, except to to make an exception for self defense.

prior probability

In our previous post, we reviewed the third subsection of Chapter 3 in which Nozick makes a strong case for preferring moral side constraints over moral end states. In the fourth subsection (pp. 33-35), Nozick will focus on the libertarian principle of non-aggression. Here, he reiterates his normative conclusion in favor of side constraints (p. 33, “The root idea [is] that there are different individuals with separate lives and so no one may be sacrificed for others …”) and then finally gets around to identifying the source of his premise that individuals have rights and the content of these rights! According to Nozick, individuals have rights just because they are individuals (“individuals with separate lives”), and further, this tautological moral fact (individuals are individuals) thus imposes a Kantian duty on all to not harm others. Or in Nozick’s words (p. 33), “the existence of moral side constraints …leads to…

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Nozick’s initial defense of moral side constraints

I am reblogging part 10 (see below) of my in-depth analysis of the ideas in Nozick’s “Anarchy, State, and Utopia.” Here, we review the third section of Chapter 3 of the book, where Nozick defends his “side constraint” view of morality, but as I explain below, I am still somewhat skeptical of Nozick’s underlying premise that “individuals have rights.” Why? Because Nozick has yet to elaborate what these rights are (beyond the duty not to harm or injure others) or where such rights come from.

prior probability

In the second subsection of Chapter 3, which we reviewed in our previous post, we saw two possible ways of operationalizing Nozick’s moral premise that individuals have rights. Either we could make it our overall goal to minimize the violation of such rights or we could treat the non-violation of our rights as a moral duty or “side constraint” upon our actions. Next, in the third subsection of Chapter 3 (pp. 30-33), Nozick will consider one of the most fundamental questions of moral philosophy: whether we should choose the end state, goal-directed view of morality or the side constraint view. Specifically, why should we treat the non-violation of rights as a side constraint and not as a goal or end state? In three words, Nozick prefers the side constraint view because “Individuals are inviolable” (p. 31). As Nozick notes (pp. 30-31), “Side constraints upon action reflect the underlying…

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Nozick on rights and moral goals versus moral constraints

I am reblogging part 9 (see below) of my in-depth review of Nozick’s “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” (ASU), which explores the second section of Chapter 3 of ASU, where Nozick draws yet another distinction — a distinction between “moral goals” and “moral constraints” or between a goal-directed view of morality and a rights-based view of morality. For now, whichever view of morality one prefers, I have two questions for readers of Nozick: (1) how are we supposed to choose between these two approaches to morality, i.e. between “end states” and “rights”? And (2) what about trade offs? In other words, how much of our “rights” are we prepared to sacrifice in order to achieve a particular end state, or vice versa, how much of an ideal “end state” are we willing to forego in order to vindicate our rights?

prior probability

In the first subsection of Chapter 3, which we reviewed in our previous post, Nozick drew a distinction between two types of libertarian government–minimal states and ultraminimal states–and identified a foundational moral problem with each type of state. Here, we will review the second subsection of Chapter 3 (pp. 28-30), where Nozick reformulates the age-old moral problem of “ends” versus “means” in terms of moral goals and moral constraints. In brief, according to Nozick, there are two ways of applying morality to our actions. One way is by setting a moral goal G or morally attractive “end state” that we hope to achieve. Although this goal-directed view of morality emphasizes ends, Nozick adds a new wrinkle to this approach. According to Nozick, our moral goal or end state need not be the traditionally utilitarian or consequential one of maximizing utility or happiness; it could just as well…

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Nozick’s two problems of libertarian theory

Let’s resume my review of Nozick’s “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” (ASU). Here, I am reblogging part 8 of my review (see below), which covers the first section of Chapter 3 of ASU, where Nozick draws a distinction between two types of nightwatchmen states: a “soft core” minimal state that protects all its citizens against harm — even those persons who would prefer to opt out of state protection altogether — and a “hard core” libertarian ultra-minimal state that only protects its own customers (i.e. a protection racket).

prior probability

Nozick begins Chapter 3 (pp. 26-28) by drawing a distinction between two types of libertarian government (see image below): a “soft core” libertarian minimal state that protects all its citizens against harm and a “hard core” libertarian ultra-minimal state that only protects its own customers. In Nozick’s own words (p. 26), a minimal state is the “night-watchman state” of libertarian theory, one that is “limited to the [narrow] functions of protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of contracts.” An ultra-minimal state, by contrast, “provides protection and enforcement services only to those who purchase its protections and enforcement policies” (ibid., italics in original). Also, Nozick identifies two foundational problems, one for each type of libertarian governance.

On the one hand, the problem for proponents of the soft core minimal state is that such a state is necessarily committed to some level of economic redistribution…

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