I concluded my previous post with a question, Doesn’t the government need to maintain a positive balance of trade as well as a large amount of gold and silver reserves for national security reasons, i.e. to finance naval fleets and raise armies in the event of invasion or war? As it happens, Smith devotes most of the second half of Book IV, Ch. 1 of The Wealth of Nations (see especially paragraphs. 20-30) to this very question, and his answer is an unequivocal NO: “It is not always necessary to accumulate gold and silver in order to enable a country to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in distant countries.” (WN, IV.i.20) Why not? Because it is a country’s purchasing power (i.e. the amount of goods and services it is able to make or buy), and not its reserves in precious metals, that determines its ability to finance a war:
“Fleets and armies are maintained, not with gold and silver, but with consumable goods. The nation which, from the annual produce of its domestic industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its lands, labour, and consumable stock, has wherewithal to purchase those consumable goods in distant countries, can maintain foreign wars there.” (WN, IV.i.20)
According to Smith, gold and silver can be “accumulated or stored up” in one of three different ways — “first, the circulating money; secondly, the plate of private families; and, last of all, the money which may have been collected by many years’ parsimony, and laid up in the treasury of the prince” (WN, IV.i.22) — but none of these methods of piling up precious metals, standing alone, will ever be enough to pay for a war because wars are expensive. Based on his careful review of the available evidence, Smith concludes: “The funds which maintained [Britain’s] foreign wars of the present century, the most expensive perhaps which history records, seem to have had little dependency upon the … the circulating money, or of the plate of private families, or of the treasure of the prince.” (WN, IV.i.26)
But this observation, in turn, poses a puzzle: if Britain’s wars were expensive, and if they were not financed by taking gold and silver coins out of circulation or by melting down private hoards of precious metals or by shipping gold and silver reserves out of the country, then how were these expensive wars paid for? For Smith, the answer is not gold and silver; it is commerce and commodities. Taking the Seven Years’ Was as his prime example, Smith concludes: “The enormous expense of the late war [i.e. the Seven Years’ War] … must have been chiefly defrayed, not by the exportation of gold and silver, but by that of British commodities of some kind or other.” (WN, IV.i.27) More specifically, Smith tells us that it was “the annual produce of the land and labour of the country” that were “the ultimate resources which enabled us to carry on the [Seven Years’] war.” (WN, IV.i.28)
As an aside, Smith also explains why trade in manufactured goods — more than trade in agricultural goods — is the best way to finance a foreign war:
“The commodities most proper for being transported to distant countries, in order to purchase there either the pay and provisions of an army, or some part of the money of the mercantile republic to be employed in purchasing them, seem to be the finer and more improved manufactures; such as contain a great value in a small bulk, and can, therefore, be exported to a great distance at little expense. A country whose industry produces a great annual surplus of such manufactures, which are usually exported to foreign countries, may carry on for many years a very expensive foreign war without either exporting any considerable quantity of gold and silver, or even having any such quantity to export.” (WN, IV.i.29)
“No foreign war of great expense or duration could conveniently be carried on by the exportation of the rude produce of the soil. The expense of sending such a quantity of it to a foreign country as might purchase the pay and provisions of an army would be too great. Few countries produce much more rude produce than what is sufficient for the subsistence of their own inhabitants. To send abroad any great quantity of it, therefore, would be to send abroad a part of the necessary subsistence of the people. It is otherwise with the exportation of manufactures. The maintenance of the people employed in them is kept at home, and only the surplus part of their work is exported.” (WN, IV.i.30)
Furthermore, free trade not only makes it easier for a country to finance its foreign wars; free trade also promotes economic growth and development in the aggregate:
“The importation of gold and silver is not the principal, much less the sole benefit which a nation derives from its foreign trade…. By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of the produce of their labour may exceed the home consumption, it encourages them to improve its productive powers, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real revenue and wealth of the society…. To import the gold and silver which may be wanted into the countries which have no mines is, no doubt, a part of the business of foreign commerce. It is, however, a most insignificant part of it. A country which carried on foreign trade merely upon this account could scarce have occasion to freight a ship in a century.” (WN, IV.i.31; my emphasis)
To simplify, the best way to make war is to allow people to make money (not just store money), and the best way to make money is to allow free trade. But if free trade is so great, why is it so maligned in politics and so rare in practice? That is, why does almost every country in the world still engage in futile and self-defeating mercantilist and protectionist politics? (To be continued …)








