I have been highly critical of the late Alasdair MacIntyre’s 2023 essay On Having Survived the Academic Moral Philosophy of the 20th Century. (See here, here, here, and here.) Today, however, I was going to conclude my review of his essay on a somewhat positive note, for as I mentioned in my opening salvo in this series, I totally agree with Professor MacIntyre’s diagnosis regarding the pervasiveness of disagreement among philosophers. Nevertheless, that said, I find it hard to say anything positive about MacIntyre’s essay. Let me explain:

First off, my main reply to scholars like MacIntyre is this: the optimal level of disagreement in any field is not zero. Secondly and more importantly, I seriously doubt whether MacIntyre’s proposed remedy would have any impact one way or another on the level of disagreement in philosophy. In brief, MacIntyre proposes two cures. One is to expand the list of required courses to obtain a degree in moral philosophy. Specifically, MacIntyre recommends in paragraph 33 of his essay that “courses in social and cultural anthropology and in certain areas of sociology and psychology should be a prerequisite for graduate work in moral philosophy.” Alas, I would prefer just one course on Homer or in 19th-century Russian literature over three dozen anthropology, sociology, or psychology courses!

MacIntyre’s other proposed remedy, which appears in paragraph 34 of his essay, consists of, and I quote, “requir[ing] on the CVs of those who aspire to teaching or research appointments in moral philosophy accounts of their relevant experiences on farms and construction sites, in laboratories and studios, in soccer teams and string quartets, in political struggles and military engagements.” Alas, although MacIntyre’s life-experience requirement is an excellent idea in theory, how would farmers, construction workers, lab scientists, artists, soccer players and coaches, musicians, politicians, and soldiers ever be persuaded to study moral philosophy? And even if we could persuade such a potpourri of “village people” to become academic philosophers, it is not really obvious what impact, if any, such a diverse range of life experiences would have on any of the ongoing substantive debates among, say, Kantians and and consequentialists.

On the other hand, perhaps the main problem with MacIntyre’s proposed reform is that it is not ambitious enough. Why not expand the life-experience requirement to include all PhD candidates in all fields?