Thus far this week (see here and here), I have posed a first-order question about Adam Smith’s “impartial spectator”: who, or what, is this imaginary moral judge? (See, for example, the short video posted below.) I, however, will now have nothing more to say about this first-order question, except to note that scholars still disagree about this question: some say the impartial spectator is simply our internal conscience, i.e. a psychological process; others insist that it is an external entity, i.e. a deity.

In this post, by contrast, I will consider in greater detail a second-order question about Smith’s impartial spectator: why didn’t Smith just tell us one way or another who (or what) the impartial spectator is? Is the problem with Smith’s writing style or with the substance of his ideas? That is, is Smith’s impartial spectator an incoherent or empty concept, or was Smith being purposely evasive when he wrote and then revised his first magnum opus, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS)?

As it happens, my colleagues Daniel Klein, Nicholas Swanson, and Jeffrey Young have published a new paper in which they all but concede that Adam Smith’s paints a confusing and conflicting picture of the impartial spectator in TMS. (See Klein et al. 2025, pp. 321-322.) More to the point, they identify a wide variety of competing motives that Smith may have had for being intentionally evasive or esoteric on this score: pedagogical, strategic, and even theological. Let’s now take a closer look at each one of these possible Smithian motives below:

1. Pedagogical motive. First off, building on the work of Arthur Melzer (2014), Klein, Swanson, and Young claim that Smith’s description of the impartial spectator is deliberately unclear and confusing for — wait for it — pedagogical reasons: “Rather than simply spoon-feed [their audience], yesteryear’s philosophers saw greater value in prompting their audience to read between the lines.” (Klein et al. 2025, p. 321.) Really? Alas, this explanation begs the question, why? Specifically, why would such a meticulous and careful writer and thinker like Adam Smith see “greater value” (let alone any value) in obfuscation or obscurity? According to Klein et al., Smith was “somewhat” opaque about the impartial spectator because “[p]hilosophical opaqueness is arguably more convincing than philosophical spoon-feeding.” Paging George Orwell.

2. Strategic motive. Next, Klein, Swanson, and Young claim that Smith was deliberately unclear about the divine or godlike nature of his impartial spectator because the Scottish philosopher wanted his moral theory to appeal not just to theists (e.g., religious believers like his mother, one would presume) but also to non-theists as well (e.g., non-believers or agnostics like his friend and mentor David Hume). In support of this conjecture, Klein et al. even have the temerity to compare the great Adam Smith to a crafty politician: “Like a politician, Smith used ambiguity, equivocation, dispersal, and inconsistency to keep from alienating certain quarters.” (Ibid., p. 322, quoting Klein & Merrill 2021, p. 714). Alas, I call bullshit, for as the economic historian Arthur H. Cole (1958) has noted, Smith was willing to criticize some of the most powerful people and institutions of his day.

In his second magnum opus The Wealth of Nations, for example, Smith called out “the usual idleness” of apprentices (WN, I.x.a.8) and the “sneaking arts” of underling tradesmen (WN, IV.iii.b.8). He also castigated “weak and wondering travelers” and “stupid and lying missionaries” and rebuked “the absurd prescriptions” of doctors (WN, II.iii.31) as well as “[l]uxury in the fair sex” (WN, I.viii.37). Ironically (given the quote in the previous paragraph comparing Smith to a politician), Smith reserved his greatest invective for politicians, “that insidious and crafty animal” (WN, IV.ii.39), and for merchants and manufacturers, whose “avidity” (WN, IV.viii.4), “clamour and sophistry” (WN, I.x.b.25), and “mean rapacity” (WN, IV.iii.c.9) impede the progress of commerce. Smith didn’t alter his writing style in The Wealth of Nations in order to appeal to greedy merchants, crafty politicians, lazy apprentices, etc. So, why would he alter his writing style in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, especially the sixth and last edition of TMS when Smith was in bad health and knew his days on Earth were coming to a close, to avoid offending theists or non-theists or whomever?

3. Theological motive. Lastly, this time building on the work of Jerry Z. Muller (1993), Klein, Swanson, and Young present a theological or religious reason for Smith’s ambiguity about the impartial spectator: “Smith may have felt that if he had provided a clear enunciation of ‘impartial spectator’ as a universal and super-knowledgeable beholder [i.e. God], that might have bred a militancy and arrogance in those who felt confident in their own access and communication with The Beholder [God].” (Klein et al. 2025, p. 322.) Again, seriously? Simply put, there are two problems with this conjecture. One is that (contra Muller 1993) we have no direct evidence of Smith’s religious views, so we have no way of confirming whether Smith really was opposed to the “austere morality” of strict Scottish Presbyterians. (Klein et al. 2025, p. 322.)

But that said, even if Muller’s musings on Smith’s religious and theological views were supported by direct evidence, it strains credulity to believe that Smith deliberately presented a confusing and unclear picture of the impartial spectator in order to avoid writing anything that would aid the “self-righteous, obnoxious, or overly austere” cause of Muller’s bogeymen (ibid.), those strict Scottish Presbyterians. Was Smith really afraid that his ideal observer theory would be so misused by such zealots that he (Smith) decided to be purposely unclear to throw them off? C’mon man.

In short, the arguments presented by Klein et al. for Smith being intentionally evasive or esoteric about his moral spectator are flimsy at best. But if Smith wasn’t being deliberately unclear, does this mean that his impartial spectator theory is itself incoherent or empty? (To be continued …)

Works Cited (below the fold)

Cole, Arthur H. 1958. Puzzles of the “Wealth of Nations”. Canadian Journal of Economics & Political Science, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 1-8.

Klein, Daniel B., and Thomas W. Merrill. 2021. Adam Smith, David Hume, liberalism, and esotericism. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 184, No. 1, pp. 712-716.

Klein, Daniel B., Nicholas Swanson, and Jeffrey Young. 2024. The impartial spectator rises. Econ Journal Watch, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 296-326.

Melzer, Arthur M. 2014. Philosophy Between the Lines: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing, University of Chicago Press.

Muller, Jerry Z. 1993. Adam Smith in His Time and Ours: Designing the Decent Society, Princeton University Press.