In addition to the three Adam Smith quotes from TMS cited by Daniel Klein, Nicholas Swanson, and Jeffrey Young (KSY) in their new paper in Econ Journal Watch on the impartial spectator (see Klein et al. 2025, pp. 304-305; see also my previous two posts), Klein et al. draw nine inferences or theses regarding these specific passages. (Ibid., pp. 306-307) Below the fold, I restate their theses, followed by a direct reply to each one:

Thesis #1

Smith clearly, unequivocally distinguishes the impartial spectator from [the] man within the breast.

My reply to thesis #1: Maybe so, but this is the only time in TMS that Smith does this! More importantly, this two-tiered system of moral scrutiny makes no sense. What, for example, is the division of labor between the impartial spectator and the man within the breast? That is, why do we need two separate actors — the impartial spectator as well as the man within the breast — to pass judgment on the morality of our actions?

Thesis #2

Smith describes the relationship between those two: [the] man within the breast (i.e., conscience) is a “representative” of the impartial spectator. (It is worth noting that, in Eds. 2–5 [of TMS], Smith had referred to “the man within” as “This inmate of the breast, this abstract man, the representative of mankind, and substitute of the Deity” (130 note r); and, in Eds. 1–5, Smith had, “Man is accountable to God and his fellow creatures” (111 note k).)

My reply to thesis #2: The relationship between the impartial spectator and the man within the breast is one of principal-agent, but as Klein et al. correctly note, the agent (the man within the breast) was described as a “substitute of the Deity” instead of his “representative” in previous editions of TMS. Alas, I don’t see the big deal here. By definition (legally speaking), an agent acts for and in the place of the principal, effectively substituting him (the principal) when he (the agent) is dealing with third parties. Also, the fact that Smith omits the phrase “Man is accountable to God and his fellow creatures” from the 6th and last edition of TMS cuts against Klein et al.’s theistic interpretation of the impartial spectator.

Thesis #3

This impartial spectator surveys [one’s] conduct and thus seems to have knowledge of [one’s] conduct. This impartial spectator seems to have intimate intelligence of [one’s] present situation, and also of “what is likely to be” [one’s] future situation.

My reply to thesis #3: What about the impartial spectator’s representative or agent, the man within the breast? Does he too have knowledge of these things? If not, what good is he? If so, what is the purpose of this additional layer of moral scrutiny?

Thesis #4

If this impartial spectator [were] a human spectator, someone perhaps named Rick, it seems remarkable that he would have such personal knowledge and not be partial to [the person whose actions he is judging]. Yet this spectator is not partial to [the person whose actions he is judging].

My reply to thesis #4. This thesis is a total non sequitur, for no one is saying that the impartial spectator is an actual “human spectator”! What some Smith scholars are saying instead is that the impartial spectator is a psychological process or a heuristic device, i.e. one’s inner voice or conscience.

Thesis #5

What’s more, this impartial spectator has such present-and-future intelligence not only about [the person whose actions he is judging], but about all of “those whose conduct he surveys.” Whereas [each person’s] man within the breast is clearly individuated to [that particular person], the impartial spectator clearly is not.

My reply to thesis #5: I am willing concede that the impartial spectator is “well-informed” (Smith himself says this) every time he comes into play, but this begs the question, when does the impartial spectator come into play? If it’s true, for example, that the average person makes up to 2000 decisions every hour (see, e.g., Krockow 2018), then which of these myriad decisions are subject to review by one’s impartial spectator? (And which of these 2000 decisions per hour are reviewed by the man within the breast?)

Thesis #6

This impartial spectator regards each surveyed person’s present and future situations “nearly at the same distance, and is affected by them very nearly in the same manner.” What human spectator could have such knowledge and such detachment over some unspecified set of surveyed persons? Moreover, what human spectator would “not feel himself worn out by the present labour of those whose conduct he surveys”?

My reply to thesis #6: Again, this thesis (like thesis #4) is a non sequitur, since no one is saying that the impartial spectator is an actual human spectator.

Thesis #7

Smith begins the paragraph speaking of the “prudent man” … in the singular. But notice what he then does. After distinguishing between the impartial spectator and the conscience, Smith consistently refers to the impartial spectator in the singular (“he”) but begins to refer in the plural to “those whose conduct he surveys” and “their present,” and so on. Smith is clearly distinguishing the oneness of the impartial spectator from the multiplicity of the subjects the impartial spectator beholds. If the impartial spectator is not God/Joy, it would seem logical to use the plural to refer to it as there are multiple spectators in a lower non-God/Joy sense.

My reply to thesis #7: In other words, according to Klein et al., although every person in the world has his own individual “man withing the breast”, there is but one — and only one — sole impartial spectator, and that is why it makes sense to re-interpret the impartial spectator as some sort of deity or divine entity: God, “Joy”, or whatever. I concede that this is a plausible interpretation, but is this theistic interpretation what Smith really meant? If so, why is there no other reference to Smith’s distinction between the unitary impartial spectator and the multiplicity of men within the breast? Why doesn’t Smith just say that the impartial spectator is a deity?

Thesis #8

In the last sentence of the paragraph Smith distinguishes the impartial spectator from virtuous people. He says that “proper exertion of self-command… enables them to act as if their present and their future situation affected them nearly in the same manner in which they affect him.” The word “nearly” suggests a superiority of the impartial spectator above even men of proper exertion of self-command. The impartial spectator can never be fully matched.

My reply to thesis #8: So what? Even if we concede that the impartial spectator enjoys an inherent “superiority” over every person whose actions he is judging, this does not tell us how much more superior the impartial spectator is: a little, a lot, or mid? Also, what about the impartial spectator’s representative, the man within the breast? How much more (or less!) superior is he in relation to both the impartial spectator and to the person whose actions he is judging?

Thesis #9

Most importantly: Smith implies that everyone surveyed by the impartial spectator has, within his or her own breast, a representative of that same being. Who is the being who is to be represented by those different, possibly many, possibly all, persons’ individual consciences? Clearly, the being described here cannot be a human being (save Jesus).

My reply to thesis #9: Once again, this thesis (like theses #4 and #6) is a non sequitur: no one is saying that the impartial spectator is an actual “human being”! But it takes a theory to beat a theory: if the impartial spectator is neither a deity nor a human, then who (or what) is he? I will conclude this series on Monday with my own theory about Smith’s impartial spectator …