One of Adam Smith’s most original — and mysterious — ideas in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) is the impartial spectator. But who or what is this enigmatic entity? My interpretation is based on the actual text of Smith’s first magnum opus. To the point, the Scottish philosopher describes his imaginary being as an “examiner and judge”, a “great judge and arbiter”, and an “awful and respectable judge” in three separate passages of TMS. For reference, all three passages are reproduced below:

“When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of.” (TMS, III.i.6)

“It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct.” (TMS, III.iii.4)

“The man of real constancy and firmness, the wise and just man …. has been in the constant practice, and, indeed, under the constant necessity, of modelling, or of endeavouring to model, not only his outward conduct and behaviour, but, as much as he can, even his inward sentiments and feelings, according to those of this awful and respectable judge. He does not merely affect the sentiments of the impartial spectator. He really adopts them. He almost identifies himself with, he almost becomes himself that impartial spectator, and scarce even feels but as that great arbiter of his conduct directs him to feel.” (TMS, III.iii.25)

In short, the impartial spectator is first and foremost a judge. But what kind of judge? Is he (or she!) more like a divine judge, i.e. one that is perfect and infallible, or is he more like a common law judge, one that is impartial and well-informed but imperfect? (To be continued …)