As I mentioned earlier this month, my colleagues Daniel Klein, Nicholas Swanson, and Jeffrey Young (KSY) have published a new paper in Econ Journal Watch, and their paper caught my attention because it’s about the impartial spectator in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). To the point, KSY claim that this imaginary being is “a universal beholder” who boasts “superhuman knowledge and universal benevolence” (KSY 2025, p. 297). In plain English, the impartial spectator is a deity or some other make-believe godlike entity they call Joy.

Furthermore, in support of this theistic interpretation of Smith’s impartial spectator, KSY put all of their argumentative eggs into one basket: TMS 215.11 or paragraph 11 of page 215 of the Glasgow edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. (As an aside, the standard citation of TMS 215.11 would be “TMS, VI.i.11” because this “smoking gun” passage appears in paragraph 11 of chapter 1 of Book 6 of TMS.) Why do Klein, Swanson, and Young put so much weight on this one passage? Because it is in TMS 215.11 (TMS, VI.i.11) where Smith describes the man within the breast as the “representative” of the impartial spectator!

But why, in turn, is this description of the man within the breast in TMS 215.11 such a big deal? Because Smith uses these two terms (the man within the breast and the impartial spectator) interchangeably in the rest of TMS! This discrepancy thus poses a puzzle: is the man within the breast an agent or representative of the impartial spectator? In other words, are they really two separate entities, as implied by TMS 215.11 (TMS, VI.i.11)? Or are they equivalents, i.e. two different ways of saying the same thing?

In short, is it possible to reconcile this discrepancy? If so, how do we square KSY’s interpretation with the rest of TMS? (Or do we square the rest of TMS with KSY’s “smoking gun” passage?) Stay tuned, I will address these key questions in my next post …