I concluded my previous post thus:

“… Rawls and Rousseau are alike in two profound ways. One is that Rawls’s definition of liberty, deep down, is really no different than Rousseau’s. The other is that Rawls’s ‘original position’, in form and in substance, is just Rousseau’s ‘general will’ in disguise.”

Let’s begin with my second claim. To see why there is a family resemblance, if not a direct correspondence, between Rawls’s original position and Rousseau’s general will, recall Rawls’s solution to the law-liberty dilemma: the “original position”. For Rawls, the original position is a hypothetical state of nature where we choose principles of justice from behind an impenetrable “veil of ignorance”, a shroud so deep and dark that it conceals our personal characteristics like race, gender, wealth, and social status. Or in Rawls’s own words:

“In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. This original position is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice. Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 11, reprinted in Cohen 2018, p. 688)

According to Rawls, we would want to hedge our bets (so to speak) by choosing only fair principles if we were to find ourselves in this strange situation because we wouldn’t know our own position or status in the future. Yet what, if anything, you may ask, does this ingenious thought-experiment have to do with Rousseau’s general will? After all, even I have to concede that there is at least one major difference between Rawls’s original position and Rousseau’s general will, a temporal one: TIMING. Rousseau’s general will is ex post, while Rawls’s original position is ex ante.

In brief, Rousseau’s general will is ex post because it does not come into existence until after the formation of civil society, that is, until after men have left the state of nature and have agreed to a social compact in which “Each of us put his person and all of his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will ….” (Rousseau, The Social Contract, reprinted in Cohen 2018, p. 272, Rousseau’s emphasis) Rawls’s original position, by contrast, is ex ante because the original position only exists before we have negotiated a social contract, i.e. prior to the creation of civil society.

Despite this temporal difference, I stand by my unconventional claim that Rawls’s original position is just Rousseau’s general will in disguise, for there is one major parallel between both constructs: the total lack of any information to guide one’s vote in both cases! Whether we are talking about real-life flesh-and-blood men voting to express their general will, as the members of ancient Sparta’s popular assembly the Appella presumably did (see here, for example), or about hypothetical Rawlsian men who are negotiating a social contract from behind a veil of ignorance, in both cases the voters are not allowed to have any information to guide their decisions! Veil of ignorance, anyone?

As we have already seen (see here, if you don’t believe me), Rousseau accomplishes this despotic and domineering goal (i.e. suppression of information) by prohibiting debate and discussion among the voters and by banning “factions” and “partial associations” to boot. But by the same token, Rawls is no different in this respect. Although Rawls is able to suppress information in a far more elegant and original way — i.e. by positing a hypothetical and mythical-sounding “veil of ignorance” — don’t be fooled. Rawls’s method is just as despotic and domineering as the Swiss philosopher’s is. In fact, Rawls, even more so than Rousseau, removes altogether our ability to access any information via his veil of ignorance.

But the deeper problem with Rawls is this: if you dig down deep enough, Rawls’s so-called “theory of justice” is in practice no different than Rousseau’s seductive but dangerous redefinition of freedom as total and absolute obedience to the so-called general will. Stay tuned, for we will do this digging in my next post. (Nota bene: I will resume my series on the paradox of politics on Monday, 8 December.)