In a previous post, I explained why Rawls’s original position is a dressed-up version of Rousseau’s general will in disguise (see here). Today, I will explain why Rawls’s approach to liberty is, at bottom, no different than Rousseau’s.

First off, recall Rousseau’s ingenious solution to the law-liberty dilemma: the Swiss philosopher redefines liberty to mean obedience with the general will. In brief, by complying with the dictates of the general will, you are ultimately obeying yourself because you voluntarily entered into a social compact in which everyone agrees ahead of time to obey the general will.

Now, compare Rousseau’s Orwellian “obedience = freedom” formula with the main gist of Rawls’s Theory of Justice. Rawls’s “money shot” (so to speak) is a hypothetical state of nature (the original position), where everyone would unanimously agree to two high-level principles of justice: (a) equal basic liberty for all, and (b) a universal safety net for the members “the least fortunate group”, whoever they turn out to be (what Rawls calls the “difference principle”).

But notice what Rawls leaves out from this picture: the permanency or finality of his money shot! That is, once the hypothetical votes have been counted — hypothetical because even Rawls has to admit that his original position is just a figment of his imagination! — and once the veil of ignorance is finally lifted, whatever we agreed to in the original position becomes firm and final and can never be changed thereafter! Once again, in other words, it’s what Rawls doesn’t say — the dog that is not barking — that is troubling.

(Of course, you could try to justify the finality of Rawls’s principles — after all, those principles were supposedly chosen on a unanimous basis from behind a veil of ignorance — but this justification does not change the fact that once the veil of ignorance is finally lifted, we are stuck with Rawls’s two principles forever.)

But what about the substance of Rawls’s two principles of justice. Perhaps Rawls’s two principles are so great that we would have no reason to change them. Alas, as I shall explain in my next two posts, neither principle is worth saving. (To be continued …)