Author Archives: F. E. Guerra-Pujol

As the infographic below shows, there are various ways of using law to reduce a harm or “negative externality,” to use the lingo of economics. These methods include (1) flat out prohibition, (2) Pigovian taxes, (3) contracts, and (4) doing … Continue reading →

That is the title of my review of Randy Kozel’s excellent book “Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent.” My essay is now posted on SSRN, the first page of which is included below:

We’ve been meaning to write up a scholarly critique of Richard Delgado’s law review article titled “A plea for narrative,” which was published in the pages of the Michigan Law Review, vol. 87 (1989), pp. 2411-2441. (Professor Delgado’s classic paper … Continue reading →

In case you’ve ever wondered what would happen if artificial intelligence were trained to perform image captions of Rorschach inkblots, this crazy website created by researchers at the MIT Media Lab is for you. Here are some sample Rorschach inkblots … Continue reading →

SCOTUS announced its decision in the Colorado gay wedding cake case yesterday (4 June). In brief, the Court side-stepped the main substantive issue (is baking a wedding cake a form of expression under the First Amendment?) and decided the case … Continue reading →

As we mentioned in a previous post (part 4 of our review of Allen and Pardo’s relative plausibility paper), “plausibility”, however defined, is just another word for “probability.” Yet, this notion of plausibility, though simple and intuitive, is a crude … Continue reading →

We have been reviewing Ron Allen and Mike Pardo’s excellent paper on “relative plausibility,” and as we mentioned in our previous post, we commend their relative plausibility theory of juridical proof for its simplicity. In brief, their theory is that … Continue reading →

In our previous post, we restated Ron Allen and Mike Pardo’s “relative plausibility” theory of legal proof (or what Allen and Pardo also call the “explanatory account” of evidence), an approach meant to displace probabilistic or mathematical theories of legal … Continue reading →