Author Archives: F. E. Guerra-Pujol

Thus far, I have surveyed “the good” and “the bad” sides of David Hume’s famous argument against miracles (see here and here). That leaves “the ugly”: Hume’s circular definition of what a miracle is. To the point, for Hume “[a] … Continue reading →

*** As I mentioned at the end of my previous post, David Hume’s argument against miracles has two big blind spots. One is the unknown probability problem; the other is the reference class problem. To appreciate the significance of these … Continue reading →

As I mentioned in my previous post, this week I will offer my own lawyerly take on David Hume’s influential argument against the possibility of miracles: the good, the bad, and the ugly. Let’s start out on a positive note, … Continue reading →

Last week, we surveyed David Hume’s influential argument against the possibility of miracles. (See here, here, and here.) This week, I want to offer my own take on Hume’s argument — the good, the bad, and the ugly — but … Continue reading →

The artist Roberta Flack, whose music made an indelible mark on my childhood, died last month at the age of 88; here is her New York Times obituary.

Having defined what a miracle is (see here) and having established the relationship between evidence and probability (here), Hume is now ready to finally unveil his novel argument against miracles. To the point, for Hume “no testimony is sufficient to … Continue reading →

David Hume finally gets around to miracles in Paragraph 12 of his famous essay on this subject (see here), where he writes: “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature” (Hume, Of Miracles, para. 12; cf. Voltaire 1764/1901, … Continue reading →

The Scottish Enlightenment figure David Hume (pictured above) makes four important preliminary observations about the relationship between evidence and probability in the first part his essay “Of Miracles” (paragraphs 3 to 8). For reference, I will restate Hume’s main points … Continue reading →

Thus far this week, I have restated Hume’s “hearsay argument” against transubstantiation (see here) and surveyed some possible exceptions to the hearsay rule in law that might be application to the case of transubstantiation (here). But what is my position … Continue reading →

Previously, I described David Hume’s restatement of John Tillotson’s anti-transubstantiation argument in the form of a logical syllogism. In summary, Hume’s syllogism is this: there is no direct evidence that transubstantiation really occurs during the sacrament of Communion; instead, the … Continue reading →