The Jevons paradox refers to the unintended consequences that can result from technological progress: on the one hand, improvements or innovations in technology not only increase the efficiency with which a given resource is used, reducing the cost of any one use of that resource; but at the same time, those very improvements and innovations can also increase the overall demand for that resource, thus cancelling out or reversing the initial cost-savings and efficiency gains!
For an everyday example of this economic puzzle, look no further than Email, social media, etc. These things make it more easier than ever before to communicate with other people, thus increasing the overall level of one’s workload, since we now have to constantly check our emails and DMs to stay on top of things.
Marc Andreesen on why building companies will become more expensive in the AI Era.
There's a notion that AI will help cut down costs and increase efficiency. However, Marc presented a strong counterargument by referencing Jevon's paradox.
This weekend, I attended the Ninth Annual Civil Procedure Workshop (#CPW9) at the venerable law school formerly known (until just last year) as the Hastings College of Law (now UC Law), and one of my favorite works hands down at this year’s conference was a totally unexpected one: a forthcoming non-fiction novel authored by one of my esteemed law professor colleagues. She shared an extended excerpt from her literary creation with us but asked us not to reveal any details about her new book until it is published, since one part of her story involves a law case that is still pending before the courts. All I am going to say (for now) is that, based on what I have read thus far, my colleague and new friend is not only one hell of a good storyteller; she is also an inspiration: I hope to follow in her literary footsteps next fall, when I will be on sabbatical to finish writing my own “law and pop culture” book.
It’s been a few years since I have dabbled in game theory (see here and here, for example). Nevertheless, building on the work of Andrew Munro, Scott Page, and others, I am happy to report that I will be presenting my “Colonel Blotto Litigation Game” work-in-progress — a draft of which is available here — at the Ninth Annual Civil Procedure Workshop (CPW9) at UC Law SF in beautiful downtown San Francisco this weekend. My talk and paper will be dedicated to the memory of my father, Don Francisco Guerra.
To close out the month of May, below are my previous posts on Assault Brigade 2506, on the Cuban Liberation Air Force, and on the Sixth Battalion (my father’s unit) — may he rest in peace and may our beloved Cuba be one day free:
This is the last installment of my series of blog posts in honor of my late father, Francisco Guerra, a veteran of Brigade 2506, Sixth Battalion.
“The last battle had an epic quality all the more tragic because it was so hopeless. It did not affect the outcome or even add a footnote to history. It was merely another moment when the men [of Brigade 2506] tried against great odds and failed.”
Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders’ Story of Brigade 2506 (1964), p. 163.
***
Wednesday, 19 April (D-Day +2)
On the road from Playa Larga (Red Beach) to Playa Girón (Blue Beach) — what I have called “the road with no name” — the men of the Sixth Battalion prepared for what would be their final engagement with the enemy — a Quixotic battle that would become known as “The Last Stand of Girón“. The previous night (18 April), their new battalion leader, Erneido Oliva (pictured below), had selected a strategic spot where the road curved. (See Johnson 1964, p. 163; see also Triay 2001, p. 80. Recall that Oliva had assumed direct command of the men of the Sixth Battalion on 18 April after their former chief, Francisco Montiel, was wounded.)
According to one account, at around 7:00 AM Oliva positioned his remaining big guns — seven bazookas — by the bend in the road and stationed the Sixth Battalion, armed only with rifles, in front of the bazookas. (See Johnson 1964, p. 163; see also Triay 2001, p. 80.) He then spoke with brigade commander Pepe San Román by radio, telling him that that a major attack was imminent and that he needed reinforcements. (Johnson 1964, pp. 163-164.) “Fifteen minutes later the Second Battalion arrived, and then ten minutes after that three Brigade tanks.” (Ibid., p. 164.)
The fighting began at 9:45 AM, and in the course of battle brigade forces knocked out three enemy tanks and an armored truck. By 12:30 AM the enemy fell back. (Johnson 1964, pp. 164-165.) But the enemy had more men and more ammunition, and they resumed their attack at two o’clock. (Ibid., p. 165.) With precious little ammunition, Oliva’s men now found themselves engaged in hand-to-hand combat. (Ibid.; see also Triay 2001, p. 81.)
Somehow, against all odds, they were able to stop the advance.
Although the brave men of the Second and Sixth Battalions were able to hold the line, they were now out of ammunition. Some men were sent back to Playa Girón (Blue Beach) for more ammo. (Johnson 1964, p. 166.) In the meantime, Oliva had lost radio contact with brigade commander Pepe San Román, so during a lull in the fighting, around 4:15 PM, Oliva went back to brigade headquarters at Blue Beach to confer with San Román. (Ibid., p. 169.) When he arrived at the command post, however, he saw the radio equipment destroyed and the maps burned. The eerie headquarters were all but abandoned. (Ibid., p. 171.) What happened next is heartbreaking:
"Thinking that he and his men had been betrayed by the Americans and abandoned by his own Brigade commander, Oliva, surrounded by three hundred of the Second and Sixth Battalions, tore off his shirt, shook his fist toward the sea and shouted that he would not abandon them; that they would die like men facing the enemy. 'I can still see Oliva standing there, shaking his fist,' one said long after." (Ibid.)
Until the end, Oliva and his men did not know they had been beaten. All they knew is that they had been betrayed.
Erneido Oliva (left), with the man who betrayed him.