“As time went by …, the exile community realized that the one true chance they had to overthrow the dictator and ensure democracy in Cuba had been on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. The image of the betrayed freedom fighter faithfully awaiting promised air support remains very powerful and poignant among Cuban Americans.”
Victor Andres Triay, Bay of Pigs: An Oral History of Brigade 2506 (2001), p. 183.
“Many have called the Bay of Pigs Invasion a fiasco. It was not a fiasco — it was a tragedy. For the first time in my thirty-seven years, I was ashamed of my country.”
Grayston L. Lynch, Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs (2000), p. 132.
***
Ten days ago, I mentioned how I discovered that my late father was a veteran of the heroic Brigada de Asalto 2506, which fought to liberate Cuba in April 1961. I compiled an extensive list of reading materials (see here) to learn more about this remarkable and awe-inspiring aspect of his life, this little corner of Cuban-American history. It suffices to say that I have now finished the fourth of four excellent books on the Cuban Brigade and the Bay of Pigs disaster and am ready to begin reporting my findings …
(As an aside, before proceeding, my favorite book by far was Grayston Lynch, Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs (2000), though the most meticulous and comprehensive history of the doomed invasion is Peter Wyden’s Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (1979), a must-read by any measure. Also, for more personal accounts of the ill-fated invasion from the perspective of the main Brigade leaders as well as some of the rank-and-file members themselves, I recommend two additional tomes: Victor Andres Triay, Bay of Pigs: An Oral History of Brigade 2506 (2001), and Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders’ Story of Brigade 2506 (1964).)
So, why did the Bay of Pigs invasion end in defeat? Alas, the men of Brigade 2506 fought valiantly and beat back a stronger and better-equipped army for three days … until they ran out of ammunition. These brave men, my father among them, were betrayed by one man and one man only: President John F. Kennedy. In summary, the invasion to liberate Cuba was supposed to have been launched at the sandy Bay of Casilda at dawn with dozens of simultaneous air strikes carried out by a squadron of two dozen Brigade aircraft — not at the swampy Bay of Pigs in the middle of the night without any air cover — but a young and inexperienced president, surrounded by a small cohort of soft New Frontiersmen like Arthur Schlesinger, watered down the original amphibious invasion plan that the CIA had drafted and presented to the White House in January of 1960.
Under the original plan, the Brigade would have landed at dawn on the soft, sandy beaches of Casilda, Cuba, less than five kilometers south of Trinidad, where opposition to Fidel Castro was strong. Simultaneous with the landing at Casilda, Brigade pilots were to launch a series of surprise air strikes against Fidel’s three main military airfields to knock out his small air force in one massive blow. With complete control of the air, the Brigade would be able to establish a safe and secure beachhead, unload their ammo and other supplies at Casilda’s deepwater port, encircle the historic colonial city of Trinidad (a huge symbolic victory given the history of Trinidad as Cuba’s oldest city), and invite the leaders of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, which was led by former prime minister José Miró Cardona, to establish a new democratic government in opposition. (The last piece of the plan was for the U.S. to extend diplomatic recognition to the Cardona government in Trinidad and overtly support the Brigade’s efforts to overthrow Fidel with extra men and materiel.)
President Kennedy, however, concluded that this plan was “too spectacular” (Wyden 1979, p. 100) and then had it postponed and watered down for purely political and aesthetic reasons. He changed the invasion site to a remote area called the Bay of Pigs, ordered the invasion to be done at night (an unprecedented undertaking in the annals of military history), ordered a reduction in the number of initial air strikes (from 22 B-26 bombers to just six), and then cancelled the remaining air strikes altogether — a fateful decision that many of his advisors called “criminally negligent”. In short, it was JFK (not the CIA) who bungled the operation. The invasion was not only doomed to fail because of his decisions; the brave men of Brigade 2506 were betrayed by the very man who sent them to the shores of Cuba.
prior probability 