Thus far, we have surveyed the first of two parts of Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality (a/k/a “the Second Discourse”), where Rousseau paints a rosy picture of the state of nature (see here and here), as well as his preface to the Second Discourse (here) and his “Dedication to the Republic of Geneva” (here), so let’s now jump into the second and last part of this great work, where Rousseau explores the origins of human inequality.
As it happens, when Adam Smith wrote his March 1756 letter to the Edinburgh Review (see here), he not only devoted a large chunk of his letter-essay to Rousseau’s Second Discourse — no less than six out of 17 paragraphs in the 1756 letter are addressed to Rousseau— Smith also singled out several sections from the second part of this work. Specifically, Smith translated three lengthy passages corresponding to paragraphs #21, #30, #31, and #63 in the G. D. H. Cole translation of the second part of Rousseau’s essay!
I therefore propose we follow the Scottish philosopher’s footsteps by revisiting those same three pivotal passages, so to this end, I am including below the fold Adam Smith’s own translations of these three sizeable excerpts, followed by the standard G. D. H. Cole translations of the same:
Today, I will survey the first part of Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (a/k/a “the Second Discourse”), which by my count contains 50 paragraphs. Among other things, the first part of Rousseau’s Second Discourse contains a lengthy but fascinating digression on the origins of language, attempts to rebut the Hobbesian picture of life in the state of nature (recall that, according to Hobbes, life outside of society is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short“), and then concludes with one of the most memorable literary pictures of all time: Rousseau’s rosy portrait of the noble savage.
For my part, I will skip over Rousseau’s lengthy digression on the origins of language — except to note that these passages may have been of great interest to someone like Adam Smith, who began his scholarly career by delivering a series of lectures on “rhetoric and belles lettres”; see here, for example: “Adam Smith’s first lectures after his university studies (at Glasgow and then Oxford) were on rhetoric and belles lettres (polite learning)” — and proceed directly to Rousseau’s rebuttal of Hobbes, which by my count appears in Paragraph 34 of the first part of the Discourse. This rebuttal is so spellbinding, if not mesmerizing, that I shall requote it in full below the fold:
Thus far, we have surveyed Rousseau’s “Dedication to the Republic of Geneva” as well as the preface to his Discourse on Inequality, so we are now ready to jump into the main body of the Discourse proper, which is subtitled “A Dissertation on the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of Mankind”. In summary, Rousseau’s Dissertation begins with a few opening paragraphs (seven in all). Here, in this short amount of space, Rousseau accomplishes two major tasks: he tells us why he is writing this work, and he describes his method of reasoning.
Motivation: Rousseau reveals what is motivating his work in the fourth paragraph of this opening section: “To mark, in the progress of things, the moment at which right took the place of violence and nature became subject to law, and to explain by what sequence of miracles the strong came to submit to serve the weak, and the people to purchase imaginary repose at the expense of real felicity” (Para. 4). In plain words, Rousseau is going to explain the emergence of modern commercial society.
Method: Rousseau is not only going to explain the emergence of modern commercial society; he is going to start his analysis with something called “the state of nature” — a mythical time when men (and women?) were free. According to Rousseau, previous writers who have invoked “the state of nature” have committed a major fallacy: they have “transferred to the state of nature ideas which were acquired in society; so that, in speaking of the savage, they described the social man” (Para. 5). How will Rousseau himself escape this error?
Rousseau concludes this opening part of the Dissertation with a startling admission: he will not waste his time with historical facts: “Let us begin then by laying facts aside …. The investigations we may enter into … must not be considered as historical truths, but only as mere conditional and hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origin; just like the hypotheses which our physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world” (Para. 6). Wait! Is Rousseau trying to say that history is “social constructed”? Is Rousseau thus the first post-modernist? Either way, Rousseau’s analogy to science is inapt, since science consists of “falsifiable” claims and propositions, i.e. ideas that can actually be tested.
I will be attending a research seminar at the University of Florida this weekend, so I will resume my review of Rousseau on Monday, Jan. 22.
The preface to Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality consists of only 15 paragraphs, but it was music to my law professor ears, for it not only contains an original discussion of “the law of nature”; the preface also reveals what motivated Rousseau to write the Second Discourse in the first place: to discover “the real foundations of human society” and the true “nature of man” (Para. 7). According to Rousseau: “… [although] all human institutions seem at first glance to be founded merely on the banks of shifting sand [,] … only by taking a closer look, and removing the dust and sand that surround the edifice, [are we able to] perceive the immovable basis on which it is raised, and learn to respect its foundations” (Para. 14). So, what are these foundations?
For Rousseau, these foundation are the precepts of natural law! But this observation begs the deeper question, how do we discover these supposedly eternal and unchanging precepts, or “principles prior to reason” (Para. 11)? Here is where Rousseau’s discussion of natural law takes an especially refreshing and totally novel and unexpected turn, for Rousseau concedes that no one really knows for sure! Or in the immortal words of the Swiss recluse himself: “We cannot see without surprise and disgust how little agreement there is between the different authors who have treated this great subject” (Para. 9). In fact, “the definitions [of natural law] of these learned men, all differing in everything else, agree only in this, that is impossible to comprehend the law of nature …” (Ibid.).
Undaunted, Rousseau makes a further contribution to the natural law literature by presenting his own definition of the true law of nature! In summary, Rousseau reduces natural law to two basic precepts: one is the law of self-preservation (“one of [these natural law principles] deeply interest[s] us in our own welfare and preservation”); the other is what I will call, for lack of a better term, the law of pity, i.e. our genuine concern for the welfare of others (“the other [principle] excit[es] a natural repugnance at seeing any other sensible being … suffer pain and death”). (Note: all the quotes cited here are from Para. 11 of the preface.) For Rousseau, these two precepts or principles play the same role in law and politics that axioms do in mathematics, for it is from “these two principles … that all the [remaining] rules of natural right appear … to be derived.”
To conclude, why is Rousseau’s approach to the law of nature so original and novel? Because Rousseau totally eschews the idea of the “common good” as part of his definition of natural law! This omission is a feature — not a bug — because trying to figure out what the “common good” is a fool’s errand, especially in a pluralist society like ours. (Paging Thomas Aquinas!) My next post will make two preliminary points about what Rousseau refers to as “the state of nature” (Saturday, Jan. 20), and I will then proceed to the First Part of Rousseau’s Discourse proper on Monday, Jan. 22.
Rousseau’s Discourse begins with a “Dedication to the Republic of Geneva” signed by none other than “J. J. Rousseau” himself and dated 12 June 1754 (and postmarked, so to speak, from Chambéry, a small Alpine town in southeast France). Rousseau’s dedication to his hometown is relatively brief and obsequious, consisting of only 23 paragraphs — with just about every single one of them heaping almost unbridled adulation on his fellow Genevans — so much so that one is left wondering what the true level of Rousseau’s sincerity is! Despite its brevity and fawning nature, Rousseau’s dedication is worth reading on its own merits because the Swiss author introduces two important puzzles or topics in this part of the Discourse:
The problem of constitutional design: what is the optimal level of democracy, and what is the optimal political unit, a small city-state or a large nation-state?
The problem of luxury markets: what is the relation between the pursuit of luxury and male virtue (and, I might add, between luxury and female chastity)?
For starters, Rousseau’s ideal political constitution consists of a small city-state in which “all the individuals [are] well known to one another” (Para. 2) and in which strict procedural limits are placed on democracy. By way of example, although Rousseau prefers a small city-state in which “the right of legislation [is] vested in all the citizens” (Para. 8), at the same time he would limit this law-making power, allowing only the magistrates to propose new legislation: “each man should not be at liberty to propose new laws at pleasure; [instead] this right should belong exclusively to the magistrates” (Para. 9). As such, my first question for Rousseau is this: who are these magistrates? Are they judges? The chief executive? Or someone else entirely? Also, how are they appointed, and why should we trust them?
The other important topic introduced in the dedication is the problem of luxury. Rousseau not only rails against the “vanities of luxury” (Para. 20); he specifically decries “the grandeur of palaces, the beauty of equipages, sumptuous furniture, the pomp of public entertainments, and all the refinements of luxury and effeminacy” (Para. 22). In addition, he praises his fellow Genevans for their self-reliance: “You are neither so wealthy to be enervated by effeminacy … nor poor enough to require more assistance from abroad than your own industry is sufficient to procure you” (Para. 13). For Rousseau, simply put, there is an inverse relation between luxury and virtue. But this observation begs the question: how exactly does the pursuit of luxury make men more effeminate and women less chaste? That is my second question for the Swiss author.
I will now conclude this post with one last question for Rousseau: dude, why are you so damn paranoid?! Specifically, why do you adopt such a sinister tone towards the end, where you write, “Beware particularly, as the last piece of advice I shall give you, of sinister constructions and venemous rumours, the secret motives of which are often more dangerous that the actions at which they are levelled” (Para. 15). What in the hell is Rousseau talking about here, and why does his warning sound so ominous?!
What is liberty? What is the relation between liberty, luxury, and “commercial society” more generally? And in what ways does commerce and the pursuit of luxury promote or hinder liberty? Among other things, I recently read Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1754) to prepare for an Adam Smith reading group led by Edward J. Harpham, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Texas (Dallas campus), to discuss these fundamental questions of political and moral philosophy with Professor Harpham and a small circle of fellow scholars. It suffices to say that I found this work to be one of the most compelling pieces of literature I have ever read. I will therefore be reviewing G. D. H. Cole’s translation of Rousseau’s Discourse, available here, in the days ahead as follows:
Dedication to the Republic of Geneva (pp. 1-7) — Thursday, Jan. 18
Preface (pp. 7-10) — Friday, Jan. 19
Opening paragraphs of “A Dissertation on the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of Mankind” (pp. 11-12) — Friday, Jan. 19
My first refereed Adam Smith paper — “Adam Smith in Love“, Econ Journal Watch, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2021), pp. 127-155 — has now been downloaded (and presumably read) over 2500 times! Below is some music from Barry White to commemorate this milestone:
prior probability 