Chapter 2 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia is divided into five separate subsections. Here, we will review the first of these five subsections (pp. 10-12), where Nozick summarizes Locke’s description of the state of nature and identifies three practical problems or “inconveniences” that could arise in a state of nature. According to Locke, the state of nature (i.e. absence of civil government) is governed by two natural laws. The first natural law is that “no one ought to harm another in his life, liberty, health, or possession” (p. 10), while the second natural law is the law of retribution. Specifically, if a person in the state of nature harms another person, the injured party has a moral right to punish the transgressor. But as Nozick correctly notes, these two laws of nature produce several “inconveniences.” One inconvenience is that men in the state of nature “will [tend to] overestimate the amount of harm … they have suffered” (p. 11), and this self-serving behavior, in turn, will lead to blood feuds or endless cycles of retaliation. (We call this inconvenience “the Hatfield and McCoy problem.”) Another inconvenience is the lack of credible commitment in the state of nature. In the words of Nozick (p. 12): “Any method a single individual might use … to bind himself into ending his part in a feud would offer insufficient assurance to the other party.” (After all, there are no courts or other legal institutions to enforce contracts.) Yet another inconvenience of the state of nature is that “a person may lack the power to enforce his [moral] rights” (id.). Specifically, “he may be unable to punish or exact [retribution] from a stronger adversary who has violated them” (id.). (We call this third inconvenience the “Pablo Escobar problem.”)
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