Let’s keep it moving, where “it” is my epic review of Robert Nozick’s “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” (ASU). To the point, the post below — Part 34 of my review — covers the third subsection of Chapter 6 of ASU and poses a key question for my fellow readers of Nozick. (¡Feliz cumpleaños, mi querida Sydjia!)
Nozick poses two additional questions in the third subsection of Chapter 6 (pp. 130-133). First, he asks whether individuals in a state of nature might agree with each other or unilaterally decide to refrain from creating or joining a protection agency, or in Nozick’s words (p. 130, emphasis in original): “… might not everyone choose to stay out, in order to avoid the [inevitable loss of freedom] at the end of the process.” (In other words, why isn’t option D (from our 1/9/18 blog post) the most likely equilibrium in the state of nature.) According to Nozick, such a possibility is not a stable equilibrium, since the state of nature is like a Prisoner’s Dilemma (p. 131): “each individual will realize that it is in his own individual interest to join a protection association (the more so as some others join) …” Really? If I join a protection agency, what…
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prior probability 