Adam Smith’s Inner Marcus Aurelius

To recap my series on the “Stoic-capitalist” dilemma thus far, how can we promote our own interest while at the same time promoting the common good? Is it possible to solve this “Stoic-capitalist dilemma” or otherwise reconcile the pursuit of virtue with the pursuit of profit? My solution to this predicament builds on the “impartial spectator” device in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. More specifically, I would transform or repurpose Smith’s imaginary observer into a Stoic sage, an inner Marcus Aurelius, if you will. Simply put, instead of trying to become a Stoic sage (an all but impossible task), one consults one’s inner Stoic sage and tries to follow his example as best one can. Let me explain:

Although Adam Smith is mostly known today for his great political economy treatise An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, during his lifetime he also published another treatise on moral philosophy (six editions in all), which was originally titled The Theory of Moral Sentiments or “TMS” for short. It is in TMS where Smith introduces his “impartial spectator”—an imaginary, unbiased judge that helps individuals evaluate their own actions and emotions:

“When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of.” (TMS, III.i.6)

In many ways, Smith’s spectator device is modelled after what Marcus Aurelius scholar William O. Stephens (2012, p. 110) refers to as Marcus Aurelius’ “big picture strategy” in Meditations, for the Roman emperor-philosopher makes many references to a proto-impartial spectator, so to speak, in his great work. He often refers to one’s “inner divinity” (ii.17), “the ruling power within us” (iv.1), and “[t]he directing and sovereign part of your soul” (v.26). Moreover, the Roman emperor-philosopher also invites us to “[t]ake the view from above” (ix.30), to imagine what the world would look like “if you were suddenly lifted up to a great height and could look down on human activity and see all its variety.” (xii.24) Accordingly, the leap in logic from Marcus Aurelius’ “view from above” to Adam Smith’s impartial observer thus entails, at most, one small step. Moreover, by repurposing or recasting Smith’s imaginary spectator as a Stoic sage, we not one but two separate problems:

First off, our inner Stoic sage can help us resolve the tension between Stoic ethics on the one hand—i.e. the pursuit of virtue for its own sake—and our capitalistic or bourgeois projects on the other—the pursuit of profits and the perpetual desire of bettering our condition. Marcus Aurelius (121–180 AD) was the supreme leader of one of the most powerful and prosperous empires in the history of the world, yet despite all his wealth and power he takes the time to describe his inner struggles—his attempts to cultivate his moral virtue and his rational judgement—even as he is fighting barbarian tribes and burying his own children. (see generally Stephens 2012, Ch. 1) If a Roman emperor is able to embody Stoic ideals while ruling a vast empire and leading men in battle, then why can’t we do so as we pursue profit opportunities or strive to better our condition in a capitalist system? In short, if Marcus Aurelius could do it, why can’t we? Perhaps with the help of an impartial spectator, our inner Marcus Aurelius, we can.

This imaginary impartial spectator/Stoic sage also solves an even deeper problem with Stoic ethics more generally: the unfeasibility, if not impossibility, of any mere mortal ever becoming a Stoic sage. To the point, how can anyone, especially in a commercial society like ours, ever hope to attain the moral perfection of a Stoic sage? After all, Stoic ethics is a demanding moral philosophy because Stoics define virtue as the only true good—what David Hume accurately but somewhat derisively refers to as “that grave philosophic Endeavor after Perfection.” (Hume 1742, p. 34) Everything else—health, money, reputation, etc.—are indifferents. Stoicism thus requires (i) total internal control over one’s emotions and judgements, (ii) constant self-examination to align one’s desires with nature, and (iii) indifference toward external events—in short, inner freedom over worldly success (cf. Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations). Is this ethical ideal even attainable, especially in a capitalist world, where ambition, material goods, and instant gratification are the order of the day?

Here is where Adam Smith’s imaginary Stoic sage comes into play. Smith’s spectator is, by definition, a made-up or imaginary entity, so why not imagine him as a Stoic wise man—a personalized Marcus Aurelius, so to speak. After all, even if Hume’s devastating critique of Stoicism is correct—even if Stoic perfection or moral virtue is an impossible ideal—we can still imagine what such an ideal might look like and use this ideal to inform our choices. Smith’s impartial spectator, recast as a Stoic sage, allows us to consult our “inner Marcus Aurelius.” Instead of trying to become or embody a Stoic sage—a difficult and perhaps impossible task—we imagine what an ideal Stoic sage would do or feel and act accordingly. In short, how to become a Stoic capitalist? Listen to your inner Marcus Aurelius!

Nota bene: I will conclude my series on the Stoic-capitalist dilemma in my next post.

In Search of the Stoic Sage | David Fideler | Stoic Insights - YouTube
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About F. E. Guerra-Pujol

When I’m not blogging, I am a business law professor at the University of Central Florida.
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1 Response to Adam Smith’s Inner Marcus Aurelius

  1. Pingback: How to be a Stoic capitalist: conclusion | prior probability

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