Author Archives: F. E. Guerra-Pujol

Alternative Title: Douthat’s Achilles’ Heel (Note: This is the fourth blog post in a multi-part series.) When are conspiracies real? We have been reviewing Ross Douthat’s recent New York Times column on this question, “A Better Way to Think about … Continue reading →

Note: This is the third blog post in a four part series. When are conspiracies real? We have been reviewing a recent New York Times column on this question, “A Better Way to Think about Conspiracies,” in which Ross Douthat … Continue reading →

Note: This is the second blog post in a four part series. As I mentioned in my previous post, Ross Douthat’s recent NY Times column on conspiracy thinking, “A Better Way to Think about Conspiracies,” formulates a four-part test for … Continue reading →

Happy St. Patrick’s Day! Ross Douthat, an influential columnist for The New York Times, recently wrote a fascinating essay titled “A Better Way to Think about Conspiracies.” As it happens, I have always been puzzled by one of the most … Continue reading →

I shall close this series of Bayesian blog posts with a confession. Ex ante, before I began building my Bayesian model of the litigation process, I had taken a dim view of the legal game. Given the complexity and ambiguity … Continue reading →

Note: This is my fourteenth blog post in a month-long series on the basics of Bayesian probability and its application to law. Happy Monday! Let’s now suppose that litigation is still a crapshoot but that plaintiffs and prosecutors are risk-loving … Continue reading →

Note: This is my thirteenth blog post in a month-long series on the basics of Bayesian probability and its application to law. Suppose that litigation is a crapshoot (to quote my mentor and favorite law school professor John Langbein); that … Continue reading →

Note: This is my twelfth blog post in a month-long series on the basics of Bayesian probability and its application to law. Suppose the litigation game is still highly sensitive and specific as before (i.e., 90% sensitive and 90% specific), … Continue reading →

Note: This is my eleventh blog post in a month-long series on the basics of Bayesian probability and its application to law. Suppose the litigation game is 90% sensitive and 90% specific, that is, suppose the process of litigation is … Continue reading →

Note: This is my tenth blog post in a month-long series on the basics of Bayesian probability and its application to law. I will now consider four possible scenarios or types of litigation games: non-random adjudication with risk-averse or ‘virtuous’ … Continue reading →