Author Archives: F. E. Guerra-Pujol

Thus far, we have defended Facebook’s new cryptocurrency Libra against the vague and specious charge that it is somehow undemocratic–vague because democracy is open to many different definitions; specious because existing currencies are not responsive to majority rule in any … Continue reading →

We turn now from jurisprudence to cyberspace. Did you know Facebook is developing a new cryptocurrency called Libra? Some critics, however, are not having it. For example, Matt Stoller, a fellow at the Open Markets Institute (oh, the irony!), recently … Continue reading →

This is the last of our series of posts about the prediction theory of law (PTL), and we may now sum up our negative assessment of the prediction theory as follows: although we concede the prediction theory cannot explain the … Continue reading →

In our previous post we acknowledged the main problem with Oliver Wendell Holmes’s prediction theory of law (PTL): its inability to explain how judges actually go about deciding cases–or in Hartian terms, its inability to explain the law from an … Continue reading →

(Note: This blog turns six years old today. During these six years, we have posted over 2300 times–2309 to be exact–or an average of 385 posts per year.) Thus far, we have explored H.L.A. Hart’s influential solution to the demarcation … Continue reading →

Originally posted on prior probability:
My favorite part of the Declaration of Independence is its concluding sentence: “And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other…

The internal point of view is a crucial aspect of H.L.A. Hart’s influential theory of law. As we have noted in our previous posts, for Hart a valid legal system requires external convergence and internal acceptance. It is simply not … Continue reading →

We summed up H.L.A. Hart’s standard criteria of legal validity in our previous post as follows: (a) external convergence, and (b) internal acceptance. That is, a norm is a legal norm when two essential conditions are met: most public officials … Continue reading →

During the month of June, I attended a series of seminars in Paris on the theme of legal realism. The seminars were led by Brian Leiter, a professor of jurisprudence at the University of Chicago. One of the big ideas … Continue reading →