Author Archives: F. E. Guerra-Pujol
There are six different “European Unions”
Originally posted on prior probability:
As the map below shows, the E.U. is not a single transnational entity but rather is composed of six separate European alliances.
Nous allons a Paris …
We will be attending some lectures on “realist jurisprudence and its competitors” by Dr Brian Leiter at the EHESS in Paris, so we will be blogging much less frequently during the next few weeks.
Our wait is over …
The oracles of SCOTUS decided Gamble v. U.S. today (17 June), upholding the nefarious “separate sovereigns” exception by a 7-2 margin. Here are three of our previous posts about this fascinating case: 1. Be like Bayes (part 3) (30 December … Continue reading
The geometry of national flags
Originally posted on prior probability:
Image credit: Jeppe and Birger Morgenstjerne
A flag for Mars
Originally posted on prior probability:
Why don’t any of the planets or moons in our solar system have their own flags? Calder Hansen proposes a new flag for Mars. More information about this proposed Martian flag is available here. Hat…
What is the optimal level of “protection”?
We have been addressing the following question in our last five blog posts: How does law get started? To sum up our Humean answer in two words, law and legal systems are just protection rackets (nothing more, nothing less), at … Continue reading
Law as protection racket: some remarks on the origins and evolution of group cooperation (continued)
How does law get started? In my previous post “Hume’s meadow” I sketched a possible three-step solution to the group cooperation problem. First, we must think of law not as some rarefied or unique realm but rather as an ordinary … Continue reading
Hume’s meadow
How does law get started? We presented and critiqued some game theory models of law and cooperation in our previous posts (June 10 and June 11). It turns out that the problem of group cooperation was first illustrated by our … Continue reading
Law and the evolution of cooperation: two questions for game theorists
In my previous post I summarized a popular game theory explanation of group cooperation: collective action. Or in the words of one notable game theorist, “the players beforehand set up a contract, or hire a sheriff, or make a kind … Continue reading
Law and the evolution of cooperation: a primer
As we have mentioned in many previous posts (see here, for example), we agree with legal philosopher John Finnis that one of the goals of law is to solve coordination problems and promote human cooperation. But one of the main … Continue reading

