Author Archives: F. E. Guerra-Pujol

Clarification (June 11, 2020): I wrote and posted this part of my extended review of Nozick’s classic book “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” back in December of 2017. Recently, however, one of my readers brought to my attention that Robert Nozick’s … Continue reading →

Nozick addresses a very intriguing question in the first subsection of Chapter 5 of ASU (pp. 88-90): when does a private protection agency in a (Lockean) state of nature have the moral right to prohibit a non-member from enforcing his … Continue reading →

Before we jump into Chapter 5 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia (ASU), let’s look at the overall structure and organization of this chapter. In brief, Chapter 5 is simply titled “The State” and is divided into eight separate subsections as … Continue reading →

My wife and I were hoping to watch “Marked for Murder” on YouTube about the alleged murder-for-hire of FSU law professor Dan Markel, but our viewing will have to wait. Now YouTube is charging its users for some content.

Nozick valiantly tries (alas, without success) to solve the stubborn problems of blackmail and criminal threats in the last subsection of Chapter 4 (pp. 84-87) of Anarchy, State, and Utopia. How? By drawing a distinction between positive-sum, value-producing “productive exchanges” … Continue reading →

In our previous post, we saw Nozick’s “limited compensation rule” for risk-producing activities: in a state of nature, such activities should be allowed, but compensation must be paid if the risk materializes and a third party is injured by the … Continue reading →

Nozick identifies a “serious problem” (his words, not ours) for the natural rights tradition in the eighth subsection of Chapter 4 (pp. 73-78): the problem of risk. (Hey, what about “uncertainty” as opposed to risk?) From a moral perspective, how … Continue reading →

Up to now, Nozick has been grappling with the following question: Why not permit all boundary crossings provided compensation is paid? Nozick, however, switches gears and addresses the opposite question in the seventh subsection of this chapter (pp. 71-73): Why … Continue reading →

For most of Chapter 4, Nozick has been wondering why all wrongful acts are not allowed so long as compensation is paid. Here, in the sixth subsection of this chapter (pp. 65-71), Nozick presents (to his mind) his strongest argument … Continue reading →