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Author Archives: F. E. Guerra-Pujol
Three theories of necessity (Post 1 of 5)
In our previous post, we compared and contrasted the standard version of the Trolley Problem with Lon Fuller’s “Case of Speluncean Explorers.” Another possible commonality between both hypotheticals is the legal theory of necessity. Since both cases involve thought experiments that present … Continue reading
Posted in Ethics, Law, Uncategorized
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The Law of the Trolley Problem
We recently rediscovered and reread Lon Fuller’s classic “Case of the Speluncean Explorers” (via Peter Suber), and in the process of writing up our own response to Fuller, we noticed a possible parallel between this hypothetical case and the famous … Continue reading
Posted in Ethics, Law, Philosophy
6 Comments
Lon Fuller’s Speluncean Explorers
In our previous post, we mentioned Peter Suber’s beautiful book on Lon Fuller’s fictional “Case of the Speluncean Explorers.” By way of background, this hypothetical case occurs in the year 4300 A.D. in the Commonwealth of Newgarth. The relevant facts … Continue reading
Posted in Ethics, Law, Philosophy, Probability, Uncategorized
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In praise of Peter Suber
We first discovered the work of Peter Suber, formerly a legal philosopher at Earlham College and now a senior researcher at Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society, sometime in 2011 or 2012, while we researching and writing up our … Continue reading
Posted in Law, Uncategorized
2 Comments
Two questions about degrees of belief
Previously, we saw how the Bayesian notion of “degrees of belief” offers a possible solution to the preface paradox. Here, we shall consider some philosophical or epistemic objections to this idea of “degrees of belief.” In his thought-provoking and beautiful … Continue reading
Posted in Bayesian Reasoning, Mathematics, Philosophy, Uncategorized
3 Comments
The Bayesian solution to the preface paradox
In our previous post, we presented Kenny Easwaran’s vivid description of the paradox of the preface. Briefly, the paradox is this: when a scholar writes up an academic paper, he would like to believe that every claim or proposition in … Continue reading
Posted in Academia, Bayesian Reasoning, Paradoxes, Philosophy, Truth
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The Paradox of the Preface
Kenny Easwaran, a philosopher at Texas A&M, recently published in the journal Nous this beautiful paper on Bayesian probabilities (hat tip: Brian Leiter). Among other things, Easwaran’s paper contains the best and most succinct explanation of the “paradox of the … Continue reading
Posted in Academia, Bayesian Reasoning, Paradoxes, Philosophy, Truth
3 Comments
Facebook 101
This fall, we are teaching a large undergraduate survey course (n > 800) on “the legal and ethical environment of business.” Instead of trying to cover everything, we will focus instead on the founding and subsequent explosive growth of Facebook–as … Continue reading
Posted in Ethics, Law, Uncategorized
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prior probability 