prior probability

You can check out more of Mari Andrew’s art here. (We are taking Sunday off to finish reading “Moral Machines”; we will resume our review of the Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism on Monday.)

We are interrupting (again) our review of the new Routledge Handbook on Libertarianism to shout out the general release of the new Blade Runner sequel (now showing at a movie house near you!), which we are hoping to see this weekend. Also, to mark this momentous occasion, we are posting a link to our old paper “Clones and the Coase Theorem,” published in 2011 in the Journal of Law & Social Deviance (LSD). See excerpts below. Enjoy!

    

 

In this post, we will review Ilya Somin’s intriguing essay “How political ignorance strengthens the case for libertarianism,” published in the new Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism. (By the way, Somin, a law professor at George Mason University, has written an entire tome about political ignorance. See book below.) First off, Prof Somin begins with the problem of voter ignorance. It’s not that voters are stupid; rather, it’s an incentive problem. Since there is a tiny probability that one’s vote will be the decisive one, it doesn’t make sense to spend a lot of time and effort acquiring relevant information and studying the issues. So, why do people vote at all? According to Somin, voting is more like pro sports: a chance to express support for one’s favorite political team! (On a personal note, having lived in Puerto Rico for many years, where island politics is the national pastime, we love this expressive explanation of voting.)

Next, Prof Somin identifies the problem of expert ignorance. As Somin correctly notes, we can’t rely on experts to “nudge” us in the right direction because people have radically diverse preferences about whatever problem or issue the experts are trying to fix. More fundamentally, as the “socialist calculation debate” of the mid-Twentieth century showed, expert knowledge is an oxymoron. (For what it’s worth, we’ve blogged about the socialist calculation debate before and have tried to apply the lessons of this great debate to the empirical economics movement of today.)

So, given how pervasive and deep the problem of ignorance is, what is to be done? Unfortunately, the rest of Somin’s essay is very weak here. Somin’s solution is to let people vote with their feet (or with their wallets) by choosing where to live and which products and services to buy: “It is easier to vote with your feet to a different city or State …, and easier still to vote in the private sector.” But in a world in which every major city has some form of occupational licensing, and in a world of giant Internet monopolies like Google and Facebook and boilerplate contracts, how much freedom do we really have to vote with our feet or wallets?

Today, we are interrupting our series of blog posts on the new Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism to offer a friendly critique of libertarian theory. Mass shootings like the one in Vegas point out a huge potential flaw with libertarianism. After all, a logically-consistent and intellectually-honest libertarian should be opposed to any and all legal restrictions on the purchase and sale of military-grade weapons, such as the Uzi sub-machine gun pictured below (our all-time favorite), since such restrictions would interfere with the liberty interests of gun dealers and gun owners. Most persons, however, favor some set of sensible restrictions on this particular form of liberty, such as background checks and waiting periods. The controversy, then, is where should these restrictions end and liberty begin? (See here, for example.) What types of restrictions, if any, are “sensible” in this context? (A separate question is whether any such restrictions would save any lives. See this.) Again, a true libertarian might say that no restrictions–or very few ones–should be imposed. (As an aside, it’s worth noting that the Second Amendment is of no help here because constitutional rights are not absolute–even the fundamental right to speech does not protect child pornographers.) What we libertarians need is a general theory of harm, one that would allow us to make principled exceptions to our liberty interests. Unfortunately, even with a general theory of harm, reasonable men and reasonable women might still disagree about its application. After all, whatever the potential harms of assault rifles might be, what about their potential benefits? Furthermore, such harms and benefits might be incommensurate (i.e. hard to compare on the same scale of measurement), and even if they weren’t incommensurable, how would we begin to predict the frequency of such future harms or weigh their magnitude? Given this theoretical stalemate, libertarian theory becomes circularly self-confirming or totally unhelpful. Either we allow everyone to do what they want (including the liberty to buy and own as many military-grade assault rifles as one wants), or we impose limits on this liberty in the name of protecting innocent life.

In this post, we will review John Thrasher’s intriguing essay on the relation between libertarian theory and social contract theory, one of the best essays in the collection of essays published in the new Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism. (Professor Thrasher is a philosopher at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia.) Among other things, Thrasher identifies two fundamental problems with libertarian theory (emphasis by us): “The first is the foundational problem of whether to base libertarian conclusions on some deontological basis (e.g., natural rights) or to adopt a consequentialist justification. The second is how to square a strong presumption against coercion with any system of collective choice and governance, that is, how to adjudicate between the anarchist and minimal government strands in libertarian thought.” In other words, what are the moral foundations of libertarian theory? (Is there, for example, an absolute moral duty to respect a person’s liberty and property?) And secondly, how does one reconcile the libertarian fetish for liberty as the sine qua non of politics against the reality that all laws limit or restrict our freedoms in one way or another?

For his part, Prof Thrasher offers a Rawlsian or contractarian solution to both of these theoretical problems. In fact, according to Thrasher, social contract theory is able to solve both of these foundational problems at once. How? Simply put, by basing the moral foundations of libertarianism on social contract theory, and not on absolute Kantian moral duties or relativistic Humean consequentialism, any restriction on our liberties would thus be self-imposed–the product of a purely voluntary social contract. In the words of Dr Thrasher, “If rational individuals have reason to endorse and comply with the rules in a contractual society, we can then use the contractual test to evaluate the rules and institutions of our own society. The social contract acts as a tool to evaluate existing and possible social rules and institutions.”

Putting aside the fact that such a social contract is a complete fiction (cf. David Hume’s classic essay, “On the original contract”), there is another major blind spot with Prof Thrasher’s social contract solution. After all, even if we were to agree with him that “agreement is the only basis of a free society,” we still have to answer the following foundational question of social contract theory: what is the moral basis of the social contract itself? (That is, “the foundational problem of whether to base libertarian conclusions on some deontological basis (e.g., natural rights) or to adopt a consequentialist justification” that Thrasher identifies in relation to libertarian theory applies equally to social contract theory as well!) Likewise, the second problem of libertarianism that Thrasher identifies (“how to square a strong presumption against coercion with any system of collective choice and governance”) also applies to social contract theory. After all, in the real world, courts routinely interfere with or refuse to enforce many agreements for reasons of public policy or when such bargains are illegal. So unfortunately for Thrasher (and for Rawls), social contract theory does not get us very far …

In honor of Catalan Insurrection Day:

1. #CatalanReferendum, via Twitter
2. Facts about Catalonia, via Marginal Revolution (Tyler Cowen)
3. Spain’s limited options for Catalan secessionism, via the University of Sydney (Ryan D. Griffiths, Pablo Guillen, and Ferran Martinez i Coma)
4. Why secessionist nationalists want to stay in the European Union, via the Volokh Conspiracy (Ilya Somin)
5. Want to secede? First, take this test, via Bloomberg View (Tyler Cowen)

In this post, we will review Richard Miller’s defense of social democracy and his critique of libertarian theory in his erudite essay titled “Learning from Libertarianism: Thanks from an Unrepentant Social Democrat,” which was published in the Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism. (Professor Miller is a professor of ethics at Cornell.) Unlike most of the authors in this collection of essays, however, Prof Miller is not a big fan of libertarian political theory. Instead, he believes in “social democracy”–a euphemism for the use of public coercion to redistribute income and promote economic equality. Alas, his critique of libertarian theory is weak and his defense of “social democracy” logically incoherent.

Let’s start with his logically incoherent defense of social democracy. According to Professor Miller, social democracy is superior to libertarian politics because social democracies are committed to “an impartial concern for fellow-citizens’ well-being” (his words, not ours). But this argument is logically untenable. Specifically, why should so-called social democrats or progressives be only concerned for the well being of their “fellow citizens”? Why don’t social democracies have a moral obligation to feed, house, and clothe all persons? (Also, what about the well-being of nonhuman animals?) After all, if we have a fundamental moral duty to show concern for others (Miller’s unstated but unavoidable premise), why does morality limit the expression of this concern to just our fellow-citizens, an example of brute luck or accident of birth if there ever was one!

What about Prof Miller’s critique of libertarian values? He says: “A committed libertarian must condemn as wrong forcibly taking a life-preserver ornamenting another’s flagpole to save someone from drowning and must support the enforcement of contracts to enter into slavery and clauses in home sales forbidding subsequent sales to African-Americans.” This facile critique of libertarianism, however, is silly and easy to rebut. Let’s start with the life-preserver hypothetical. (Let’s put aside the issue of whether an “ornamental” life-preserver would actually work. That is an empirical question outside the realm of ethics and moral philosophy, except for Humean consequentialists.) In this case, a true or “committed” libertarian would not be opposed to taking a life-preserver to save someone from drowning. A libertarian would only require that compensation be paid to the owner of the flagpole for the use of his ornamental life-preserver.

But what about slave contracts and restrictive covenants? After all, libertarians are champions of the principle of liberty of contract, so broadly speaking, libertarians would say that people should be free to enter into whatever agreements they want to, so long as these are voluntary and based on mutual consent. As a result, a slave contract is easy for a libertarian to condemn, since no person would freely consent to slavery. Restrictive covenants are likewise easy for most (but perhaps not all) libertarians to criticize, since such covenants interfere with free markets and the property rights of existing homeowners, artificially limiting to whom they can sell their homes to.

 

In this post, we will begin our review of 11 essays published in The Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism, a collection of new works edited by Jason Brennan, Bas van der Vossen, and David Schmidtz. Without further ado, let’s begin with Christopher Freiman’s excellent essay on “Libertarianism, Selfishness, and Public Goods.” (For your reference, Professor Freiman is a professor of philosophy at the College of William and Mary.) 

In his essay, Prof Freiman repeats a point associated with the great economist Ronald Coase and with “public choice theory” generally: there is an asymmetry in most calls for public regulation of the economy. (Consider, for example, the clamor for some form of government regulation of Internet giants like Google and Facebook.) Specifically, defenders of government intervention in x area of the economy tend to focus on the existing set of problems created by private actors in that area of the economy, but at the same time, they tend to ignore the new set of problems that will be created by public actors if those public actors are indeed allowed to regulate that area of the economy. As Prof Freiman correctly notes, public actors are NOT immune from the same imperfections that plague private actors and private action (e.g. externalities, short-term thinking, free riding, etc.). As a result, instead of positing ideal public actors, we must consider the possibility of selfish, unjust, or ignorant public actors.

What does all this have to do with libertarian theory? Everything. Libertarian or laissez-faire policies may produce suboptimal outcomes, but so what? Government regulation might produce even worse outcomes, or to borrow Prof Freiman’s own eloquent example:

Think of it this way. All-Star and MVP baseball player Bryce Harper only gets a hit on about 1/3 of his at bats. Failing 2/3 of the time is pretty bad in absolute terms. So should the Washington Nationals cut him? Of course not. The reason is simple: the next best alternative to Harper is an even worse hitter. The standard for judging athletes isn’t perfection but rather the other available options. It turns out that Harper is about as good as it gets. The same can be said of the private sector; it’s often the least flawed of our nothing-but-flawed options.

Although we agree with Prof Freiman, we would also note that some forms of government intervention are not only a necessary evil, but also the lesser evil when compared with laissez-faire. By way of example, consider the brawl between between Bryce Harper and Hunter Strickland that occurred earlier this season. (See film clip below.) What would have happened had there been no umpires to stop the fight?

Routledge has published a new handbook of libertarian theory; see book cover below. Unfortunately, the book is way too expensive, but our friends and colleagues at The Volokh Conspiracy have posted the following summaries of select essays published in the handbook:

1. Christopher Freiman, “Libertarianism, Selfishness, and Public Goods” (our review of Freiman is here)
2. Richard W. Miller, “Learning from Libertarianism: Thanks from an Unrepentant Social Democrat” (our review of Miller is here)
3. John Thrasher, “Libertarianism and Contractarianism” (review of Thasher here)
4. Ilya Somin, “How Political Ignorance Strengthens the Case for Libertarianism” (review of Somin here)
5. Javier Hidalgo, “The Libertarian Case for Open Borders” (review of Hidalgo here)
6. Jessica Flanigan, “Libertarianism and Medicine” (review of Flanigan here)
7. Thomas Mulligan, “Libertarianism vs. Meritocracy” (review of Mulligan here)
8. Fabian Wendt, “Libertarian Property Rights and the Lockean Sufficiency Proviso” (review of Wendt here)
9. Ryan Muldoon, “Reasons to Tolerate” (review of Muldoon here)
10. Jahel Queralt, “Economic Liberties are also the Liberties of the Poor” (review of Queralt here)
11. Hillel Steiner, “Free Markets and Exploitation” (review of Steiner here)