In my previous blog post, I showed how the outcome of an appeal can depend on the type of voting rule appellate courts use to decide cases, and I mentioned a possible solution to this paradox: bayesian voting. In brief, bayesian voting would not change the way the parties make their arguments. The party with the burden of persuasion on a given legal issue would continue to write legal memoranda, submit legal briefs, and present arguments to the court, and the opposing party would also have the opportunity to do the same things, but bayesian voting would change the way appellate judges decide cases.
Specifically, instead of voting up or down on the outcome of an issue, judges using bayesian voting would have to disclose how strongly or weakly they believed in each side’s arguments. For this method to work, however, judges would have to vote sincerely (a big if, as we shall see in our next blog post), and they would have to use the same numerical scale. By way of example, see the image below, depicting a sliding scale starting at 0 (meaning complete disbelief in the arguments made by a party) and going up to 1 (meaning complete belief in a party’s arguments). So long as the judges use the same scale, it’s okay if each judge uses his own criteria to evaluate the strength of each party’s arguments. After all, the assignment of probabilities is a subjective activity; bayesian voting just makes this fact explicit.








