Author Archives: F. E. Guerra-Pujol

Now that we have addressed Chapters II and XII of “Natural Law and Natural Rights,” let’s jump into Chapter III, shall we? (We will thus skip Chapter I for now.) Among other things, we’ve already highlighted Professor Finnis’s preliminary clarifications … Continue reading →

We interrupt our extended review of “Natural law and natural rights” (we will hit Ch. III tomorrow) to take this opportunity to agree with our friend and colleague Ilya Somin, a law professor at George Mason University, that today (May … Continue reading →

We have thus far reviewed Chapter XII and the first half of Chapter II of John Finnis’s beautiful book “Natural Law and Natural Rights.” (Recall that Professor Finnis’s preface invites us to begin with these chapters.) Chapter II is devoted … Continue reading →

Although we have been extremely critical in our previous posts of John Finnis’s flawed and self-defeating reasoning, the learned professor rehabilitates himself in the third and fourth subsections of Chapter II, where he makes yet another preliminary clarification–this time about … Continue reading →

Yes, he did, in the second subsection of Chapter II. Before we explain why, recall that Professor Finnis is devoting this early chapter to make a series of “preliminary clarifications” (p. 24) before delving into the details of his theory … Continue reading →

As promised, we now proceed to Chapter II of “Natural Law and Natural Rights.” Professor Finnis begins this chapter by clearing his throat, so to speak, and announcing that his “present purpose … is not to anticipate later chapters, but … Continue reading →

Thus far, we have ripped to pieces the main arguments in Chapter XII of “Natural Law and Natural Rights.” Specifically, we have explained: Why Professor Finnis’s “practical reasonableness” criterion is indeterminate and idiosyncratic (see our April 23 post); Why his … Continue reading →

Professor Finnis explores one of the most difficult and fascinating moral questions in subsection 3 of Chapter XII: “How does injustice … affect the obligation to obey the law?” Or more simply put, Does one have a duty to obey … Continue reading →

Hey, what’s up? Let’s put on hold our previous objections to John Finnis’s theory of law and proceed with our review of “Natural Law and Natural Rights,” shall we? By my count, Professor Finnis identifies no less than six separate … Continue reading →

We begin with Chapter XII of “Natural Law and Natural Rights” because Finnis himself recommends that we do so. This fascinating chapter is divided into four separate subsections (XII.1 through XII.4). In first subsection (XII.1), Finnis makes two important claims. … Continue reading →