Category Archives: Game Theory
Why are abstracts of law review articles so damn long?
Years ago, we blogged on the state of legal scholarship by posing the following question: why are modern law reviews so dull, tedious, and boring? The problem is that most law review articles today are way too long and have … Continue reading
Visualization of a “design arms race” (soda can edition)
Why do the designs of the Dr Pepper and Squirt soda cans change less frequently (i.e. are more stable over time) than the designs of Pepsi and Coke cans?
Statutes as lemons (critique of Kavanaugh, 2016)
We have just finished reading Brett Kavanaugh’s highly original essay “Fixing Statutory Interpretation” in the Harvard Law Review, vol. 129 (2016), pp. 2118-2163. (Kavanaugh, who we shall now refer to as “K-1”, is a federal appellate judge on the D.C. … Continue reading
In memory of Thomas Schelling, the errant economist
Update (1/22/17): check out this touching tribute to Schelling by Glenn Loury. (Hat tip: Garrett Jones, via Twitter.) We have been trying to stay away from the Internet during our “Christmas sabbatical” to spend more time with our family, attend to … Continue reading
Negative tipping?
What’s up, doc? As you may be aware of, a growing number of establishments are beginning to flat out ban the practice of tipping. But what if, instead of abolishing tipping, patrons had the option ex ante of giving a “negative tip.” In … Continue reading
Legal prophecies
In previous papers, we have used Bayesian methods to predict litigation outcomes (“A Bayesian Model of the Litigation Game“), and we have also modeled litigation as a game of poker (“The Poker-Litigation Game“). In our latest work (“The Colonel Blotto Litigation Game“), we model litigation … Continue reading
Legal probabilities
In this post, we build on the work of Dixit & McAdams (see our previous two posts) in order to create a general bargaining model of civil litigation. Let’s consider a civil case for our model. Specifically, let’s assume the case has … Continue reading
Politics as Nash bargaining
In our previous post, we presented this beautiful essay by Avinash Dixit and David McAdams, who use game theory to analyze the year-long political impasse over the U.S. Supreme Court. We now wish to say a few more words about … Continue reading