Is an immoral promise a “promise”?

We address this paradoxical question in our work-in-progress titled “Immoral Promises.” We consider this question to be a “paradoxical” one because people are generally supposed to keep their promises according to most theories of morality. In short, most philosophers think it is morally wrong to break a promise. But what about an immoral or illegal promise? Here is an excerpt from page 4 of our paper:

“Many theorists define valid promises in such a way as to exclude promises to perform immoral acts. (See, e.g., Shiffrin, 2011, p. 160: ‘I deny that immoral “promises” are true promises.’) On this view of promising, an evil or immoral promise is not morally binding or obligatory because such a promise is not really a promise in the moral sense. In particular, this line of argument focuses on whether a promisor has a moral or legal right to perform the promised act. (Ibid., pp. 159-163.) Simply put, if one does not have a right to perform X (where X is some immoral or wicked act), then a promise to do X is a defective promise. 

“By the same token, David Owens (2006) proposes a similar solution to the problem of immoral promises. First, Owens reframes a promise as a transfer of authority from the promisor to the promisee. That is, according to Owens’s ‘simple theory of promising,’ whenever I make a promise to someone, what I am really doing is giving the promisee (the recipient of my promise) the authority to require me to perform my promise. This reframing thus solves the problem of immoral promises, since promisors lack ex ante the authority to perform immoral actions. In other words, if I lack the authority to do something immoral in the first place, then I also lack the authority or normative power to promise to do that very same immoral act in the future, or in the words of Owens (ibid., p. 72, n. 28): ‘Where the promisor has no authority to do the thing promised (for example, a promise to kill or maim), no grant [of authority] can be made and the promise is nugatory …’

“But is a promise really a transfer of authority (in the case of Owens) or a transfer of rights (in the case of Shiffrin)? If so, how does a promise effectuate such a transfer? We would argue that all such transfer theories of promising, including Owens’s, are unable to circumvent Hume’s famous objection. (See generally Habib, 2014.) In particular, how does the mere recital of a few (magical?) words change anything about the world?

“In any case, let us assume that either Owens’ or Shiffrin’s account of promising is the correct one. We are not out of the woods yet because such transfer theories are vulnerable to two potentially fatal flaws. First, both theories of promising are devoid of any substantive content because they do not provide any criteria for determining whether one has the legal right or the moral authority to do X in the first place. That is, although the validity of a promise under these transfer theories of promising depends on the content of one’s promise, these theories are empty; they provide no criteria for evaluating the goodness or badness of the content of promises. Such criteria are entirely external to the rights theory or authority theory.

“Furthermore, as Charles Fried (1981, pp. 96-97) points out, it is not always obvious what the relevant moral or legal baseline of the parties is. Consider the breaking bad problem anew, [which we discuss on page 2 of our paper]. Despite the best efforts of the police, there exists a thriving black market for crystal meth in New Mexico and beyond. In an ideal world, it would be best if this illegal meth market did not exist, since meth is a highly addicting and dangerous substance, but this market does exist, so if Walt and Jesse don’t meet this demand, other less scrupulous suppliers most likely will. Assuming that no one is coerced into consuming this dangerous drug, can we really say that Walt and Jesse don’t have an ex ante moral right to engage in the meth trade?”

Image Credit: AMC

Bibliography:

Charles Fried, Contract as Promise, Harvard U Press (1981).

F. E. Guerra-Pujol, Immoral Promises, work in progress (2016).

Allen Habib, Promises,” in Edward N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (spring 2014 edition).

David Owens, “A simple theory of promising,” Philosophical Review, Vol. 115, No. 1 (2006), pp. 51-77.

Seana Valentine Shiffrin,Immoral, conflicting, and redundant promises,” in R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman, editors, Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon, Oxford U Press (2011), pp. 155-178.

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#WeAreOrlando #SomosOrlando

Nunca te olvidaremos. We will never forget you.

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Orlando, our city, in our hearts and prayers

Tel Aviv city hall tonight

Tel Aviv City Hall (via reddit)

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Light pollution map

Via imgur (h/t glowdirt). Click on the map to enlarge.

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The law of the law of the law of interpretation?

As we mentioned in our previous blog post, William Baude and Stephen Sach recently posted on SSRN an 85-page magnum opus titled “The Law of Interpretation.” (By the way, on the bottom of each page of their article, there is an obnoxious disclaimer stating “Draft–please use caution before citing or quoting.”) We decided to write up a formal reply to their article, though whether we used sufficient “caution” in quoting from their article, we can’t say. Here is an excerpt from our reply (footnotes omitted):

To their credit, Baude and Sachs eventually anticipate our regress objection toward the end of their [85-page] article. Nevertheless, their last-ditch though no doubt sincere effort to salvage their newborn theory is too little, too late. Although they concede that “there can be uncertainty or disagreement” about their second-order legal system, they then conjure up out of thin air the existence of (third-order?) “closure rules.” According to Baude and Sachs, these meta-magical closure rules can be either procedural or substantive, but alas, their lengthy article does not specify what these “closure rules” consist of or where judges can go to find them. Worse yet, Baude and Sachs end up conceding that their so-called closure rules are themselves contested and open to ambiguity. As a result, they also posit a set of (fourth-order?) “authority rules” for resolving disputes about the closure rules. Yet the existence of meta-meta-magical rules of authority compounds the regress problem with a tautology. Why? Because the rules of authority are simply arbitrary rules that answer the question “who decides?” in the final instance. But telling us who has the last word in matters of interpretation does not solve the problem of interpretation. Again, we are back to where we started …

So, where does this leave us regarding the problem of legal interpretation? Back to the proverbial drawing board, we’re afraid to say.

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The law of the law of interpretation

William Baude (University of Chicago) and Stephen E. Sachs (Duke University) recently posted on SSRN an important paper titled “The Law of Interpretation.” (How important? Their paper will be published in the Harvard Law Review–that important!) Law professors like Baude and Sachs and their kin have killed millions of trees writing papers and whole books about legal interpretation (the Baude & Sachs paper, for example, is 85 pages and contains 372 footnotes) because interpretation is so central to what courts do in deciding hard cases, especially cases involving constitutional law. Specifically, courts must resort to various theories of interpretation when there are gaps in the law or when the applicable law consists of conflicting rules or legal principles. For their part, Baude and Sachs claim that “legal interpretation … is deeply shaped by preexisting legal rules. These rules tell us what legal materials to read and how to read them. Like other parts of the law, what we call ‘the law of interpretation’ has a claim to guide the actions of judges, officials, and private interpreters — even if it isn’t ideal. We argue that legal interpretive rules are conceptually possible, normatively sensible, and actually part of our legal system.” In other words, the authors claim that there are rules of legal interpretation and that these rules comprise a second-order legal system.

Nevertheless, although we don’t want to be “that guy,” we are obliged to point out a fundamental logical flaw in their argument, a blind spot that destroys their entire theoretical edifice in a single blow. Specifically: what happens when there are gaps in these second-order interpretative rules themselves, or when the rules in this second-order system are themselves in conflict? Is there a third-order law (i.e. a law of the law of interpretation) to help us interpret the second-order interpretation rules, or do we have an infinite regress? (Addendum: we have posted a formal reply to Baude & Sachs on SSRN.)

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Most stolen books

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Where do we place our bets?

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Bayesian models as predictions

Our friend and colleague Jeremy E.C. Genovese recently brought this short theoretical paper to our attention. The paper, which was written by Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, Richard D. Morey, and Michael D. Lee, is titled “Bayesian benefits for the pragmatic researcher,” and we strongly recommend it. In brief, their paper explains how we can use Bayesian methods to answer to practical but non-experimental questions that standard statistical methods are unable to answer, e.g. is there any correlation between the box office success and the quality of Adam Sandler movies? What we liked most about the paper, however, is the authors’ Popperian discussion about the role of prediction in Bayesian models. Here is an excerpt (emphasis in original):

For a Bayesian, the crucial task is to specify [his] model generatively, before it has made contact with the observed data. In the other words, the model needs to be specified in such a way that it generates data and thereby makes predictions. Without making predictions, a model cannot be tested in a meaningful way.

Screen Shot 2016-06-06 at 10.16.56 AM

Credit: Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, Richard Morey, and Michael Lee

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“Respondeat Superior” (the Law of Agency)

Because of the ubiquity of principal-agent relationships in the business world, we will spend an entire lecture on the law of agency in our next class. Also, although we have been focusing mostly on the founding of Facebook this semester, let’s take a “time out” from social media, and let’s instead consider the fictional world of secret agent #007 James Bond.

In legal terms, Mr Bond works for the British secret intelligence service, known as “MI6” for short. Mr Bond is thus the AGENT, while MI6 is the PRINCIPAL. Whenever we see a principal-agent relationship, an important legal question that often arises is this: When is the principal legally liable for the acts committed by its agents? Under the legal doctrine of respondeat superior, the answer depends in large part on whether the principal’s agents are employees or whether they are independent contractors.

Consider, by way of example, the opening car chase sequence in the film “Skyfall,” in which James Bond and fellow secret agent Eve Moneypenny chase some bad guys and appear to inflict various harms against merchants of the Grand Bazaar, a huge market located in Istanbul, Turkey (pictured below), where this car chase sequence takes place. Now, let’s imagine what would happen if the owner of the Grand Bazaar were to sue MI6 in tort on behalf of its merchants for the negligent acts of MI6’s agents James Bond and Eve Moneypenny. Would MI6 be legally liable under the law of agency — specifically, under the doctrine of respondeat superior — for the property damage caused by secret agents Bond and Moneypenny in the course of their mission? To answer this question, we will re-enact a hypothetical legal proceeding in our next class: Grand Bazaar vs. MI6. We will need several student volunteers for this in-class assignment:

  1.  Barrister-at-law* for the Grand Bazaar: Your mission, should you decide to accept it, is to argue why MI6, the principal, is legally liable for the torts (property damage) caused by its secret agents James Bond and Eve Moneypenny during the car chase scene in the Grand Bazaar.
  2. Barrister-at-law for MI6: Your mission is to argue why MI6, the principal, is not legally liable for the tortious act of its secret agents James Bond and Eve Moneypenny.
  3. Barrister-at-law for the secret agents: Your mission is to argue why your clients James Bond and Eve Moneypenny did not commit any torts, i.e. are not themselves directly responsible for the property damage that occurred during the car chase.
  4. The Jury: The class as a whole will play the role of the jury.
[*] Note: A barrister is how a trial lawyer is referred to in England.
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