Emails are an efficient way of communicating with others across the globe and getting things done. The problem, however, is that many email-senders do not always fully internalize the “time costs” that their emails impose on the recipients of such emails. From an economic perspective, one could argue that such senders generate negative “email externalities” when the time costs of their superfluous emails exceed the benefits. This is especially true of spammers and people who like to hit “Reply-All.” Our strategy for dealing with such email externalities is to check our emails only during designated times of the day … and never on week-ends. What’s yours?
Tax-collection devices

This little yellow fire hydrant, located at 393 University Avenue in Toronto, has raked in more than $289,000 in parking-infraction revenue for the City of Toronto since 2008. (You can read the full report here.) As you can see from this Google Street View image, the fire hydrant tax-collection device is set well back from the curb and there are no warning or no-parking signs. (Hat tips to Tyler Cowen and Michelle Dawson.)
Should we pay people to vote?
According to this recent report by David Zahniser of the L.A. Times, only 23% percent of registered voters ended up casting ballots in last year’s mayoral election. To remedy this raging epidemic of voter apathy, the Los Angeles County Ethics Commission (!) has authorized L.A.’s city council to conduct a pilot program that would pay people to vote in local elections:
On a 3-0 vote, the [Ethics Commission] said it wanted City Council President Herb Wesson … to seriously consider the use of financial incentives and a random drawing during its elections, possibly as soon as next year … “Maybe it’s $25,000 maybe it’s $50,000,” said Commission President Nathan Hochman. “That’s where the pilot program comes in — to figure out what … number and amount of prizes would actually get people to the voting box.”
As we understand it, the proposed system would work like an election-day lottery. Instead of paying every voter some nominal sum for voting (like one dollar or 50 cents), every voter would instead have some positive probability of winning a large cash prize. We like this idea in principle, but did the members of the L.A. Ethics Commission consider the most obvious reason for the low turnout in last year’s mayoral election? Maybe the candidates were just lame. In that case, low voter turnout would be a rational response.
Why not?
Is the Coase theorem unfalsifiable?
Our recent discussions with Glen Whitman about slavery, Haitian zombies, and the Coase Theorem has led us to think deeper about the relation between the Coase Theorem and other “legal failures.” (We consider the institution of slavery a paradigm case of a legal failure because it was the law, not free markets, that made slavery possible prior to abolition. By the way, you can find other examples (some fictional) of legal failures in our short essay “Buy or Bite?,” which also appears as Chapter 12 in the new book Economics of the Undead, which we highly recommend.)
Consider the U.S. Civil War — or the War between the States, as this terrible conflict is sometimes referred to in the South. As Paul Samuelson once noted in his short paper Some uneasiness with the Coase theorem: “the Civil War was not aborted by purchase of the slaves and setting them free.” In other words, although it would have been in the mutual interest of both abolitionists and slave-owners to negotiate a deal rather than go to war, such a Panglossian outcome or “Coasian bargain” did not occur. Dogmatic defenders of Coase’s theorem, of course, will resort to postulating the existence of “transaction costs” or market frictions preventing the parties from negotiating a mutually-beneficial deal, but doesn’t this vague and all-purpose excuse make the Coase theorem unfalsifiable in principle?
But aside from the important issue of falsification (an issue that is essential for us academics who care about intellectual honesty), we wish to make an even more important point, especially in the context of slavery. In short, what about the interests of the slaves themselves? In fairness to Glen, he actually takes the time to address this concern in one of his replies to our initial critique of his post on Haitian zombies. Our point here is that most slaves were simply unable to purchase their own freedom as a matter of common law (i.e. slaves lacked the “legal capacity” to enter into contracts), so how can we talk about the Coase theorem when one side to a possible transaction is prevented from bargaining at all? More importantly, notice that our focus is not on slave-owners or the Civil War; our focus is on the slaves themselves and their unjust plight created by the law.
Next time, let’s negotiate.
Does the institution of slavery refute the Coase Theorem?
We think it does … because slaves by definition are unable to bargain for their freedom. Our colleague and good friend Glen Whitman says it does not … read his reasons and our objections to his argument in the comments section to this fascinating blog post on “Haitian zombies and slave economics.” (Recall that the Coase Theorem predicts that an economic asset will be allocated to its most valuable use regardless of who initially owns that asset, provided that market frictions or “transaction costs” are low — i.e. provided that the owner of the asset is able to bargain with potential buyers who want the asset.) Who is right?
A reverse-Facebook experiment
Our friends at Facebook recently received a lot of bad press for conducting a masssive secret psych experiment on 700,000 of its users without their consent. (Update: The journal that published Facebook’s research published a pusillanimous Expression of Concern but did not impose any sanctions on the authors of the research report.) One Facebook user, however, recently conducted a reverse-Facebook experiment by “liking” everything he saw on his Facebook feed:
I liked everything. Or at least I did, for 48 hours. Literally everything Facebook sent my way, I liked—even if I hated it. I decided to embark on a campaign of conscious liking, to see how it would affect what Facebook showed me. I know this sounds like a stunt (and it was) but it was also genuinely just an open-ended experiment. I wasn’t sure how long I’d keep it up (48 hours was all I could stand) or what I’d learn (possibly nothing.)
Is Mat Honan, the Facebook user who concocted this diabolical reverse-Facebook experiment, a mad genius? What would happen to Mark Zuckerberg’s vaunted algorithms if everyone with a Facebook account did this for 24 hours? (Thanks to digg for the pointer.)
Law’s dirty little secret …
Michelle N. Meyer, an academic fellow of bioethics and biotechnology at Harvard Law School, recently brought to our attention this fascinating blog post titled “Leveling Up,” which was originally written by law professor Christian Turner. She helpfully describes various levels of legal analysis as follows (emphasis added by us):
Level 0: The outcome of this dispute should be O.
Level 1: The outcome of this dispute should be O because of rule R …
Level 2: Rule R should determine the outcome of this dispute because of principle P (e.g., efficiency; fairness; market failure) that justifies rule R.
Level 3: This dispute is appropriately resolved (i.e., the choosing of R and P should be done) by institution I (e.g., trial court, appellate court, legislature, agency, the people via referendum).
Level 4: Institution I is the appropriate entity to resolve these types of disputes because of the theory of institutional choice T (e.g., comparative institutional competence to apply principle P and/or develop its informational inputs; separation of powers; legitimacy of decision-making by (un)elected decision-makers).
Notice, however, that in law there are rarely any right answers at any of these levels of legal analysis, especially levels 2, 3, and 4. Principles, for example, are always up for grabs in law, and there are no real clear-cut rules for demarcating legislative and judicial spheres of influence. (Level 0 is not even a method of “analysis” but rather a type of empty argument based on a mere conclusory assertion.) Even level 1 often produces contradictory legal conclusions, especially when the applicable rule is broad, unclear, or “open-textured” (to borrow HLA Hart’s famous phrase). What does this say about the study of law and legal analysis generally? Is legal analysis more a matter of aesthetics or politics than it is of logic?
What’s yours?
Fair or foul?
According to our friends at ESPN, a federal judge in Northern California has ruled that the NCAA can’t prevent college athletes from selling the rights to their names. Judge Claudia Wilken, in a landmark 99-page decision, has ruled in favor of former UCLA basketball star Ed O’Bannon and 19 other former student-athletes who sued the NCAA in federal court, claiming the NCAA conspired with universities and athletic conferences to block college athletes from getting a share of the revenues generated from the use of their images in television broadcasts and video games. In addition, the judge issued an injunction that allows some college athletes to have monies generated by the sale of television rights put into a trust fund on their behalf. Our good friend and former colleague Marc Edelman has done extensive research in this area (check out his SSRN homepage here and his Twitter feed here), so we can’t wait to hear his take on the recent ruling in the O’Bannon case in the days and weeks ahead. Addendum #1: According to Kevin Trahan, Judge Wilken’s “landmark” ruling may not be as bad for the NCAA at it appears. Addendum #2: In any case, the NCAA has announced that it will appeal Judge Wilken’s ruling.
Please don’t sue us.
Extra points
In today’s league, the specialization of NFL kickers means that missing an extra point is a formality gone terribly awry, like French-kissing the pope’s ring or holding the door open for someone to an empty elevator shaft.
That remarkable sentence is from Jason Bailey’s thoughtful essay about the extra-point play in American football. (Thanks digg for the pointer.) Mr Bailey reports that professional NFL football kickers have made 98.8% of their 20-yard extra-point attempts since 1999 (the earliest season that these data are available in Pro-Football Reference’s Play Index), and he then discusses different suggestions for making the extra-point play more exciting. Considering that almost 99% of extra-point attempts are successful, why hasn’t the NFL done this already?









